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The present study is set within the broad area of adult development 
and functioning. It is primarily located within the developmental 
theory of Erik Brikson, who described development, not only frem the 
perspective of the growing child, hut with the understanding ox the 
continuity of development over the entire life cycle (1878). As this 
represents m  area of relatively recent concern, there are many gaps 
in the literature.
A cognitive map in the fom of a hypothetical construct ten&ad the- 
Transitional Space was described and developed in this woi-k, to 
facilitate tha undetstartiing of both, individual and cduyle 
development and functioning. This hypothetical construct was based 
on Winnicott's (1971) original notion of transitional phenomena, which 
he located as being between inner and outer reality. The Transitional 
space may be briefly described as that part of the inner world that is 
projected outwards, and both reflects the internal frame of reference 
through which the perception of the world is filtered, as well as 
those aspects of hidden inner reality that are perceived by others as 
being "me".
The Transitional Space comprises three aspects, namely: boundary 
quality, content, and size.
Boundary quality of the Transitional Space reflects the ability of 
the individual for intimate contact, and id described in terms of the
parameters of flexibility and permeability.
The content of the Transitional -pace is described as that 
aspect that is concerned with ego identity (Erikson 1968).
Finally, the aspect of the size of the Transitional space isNa 
reflection of progression along the continuum of ego development as 
operationalizud by Loevinyer et al (1970):. ” " '
As it has been found that systems are most accessible to observation 
and study during periods of change, it was decided to locate the study 
at a point of developmental change or crisis. The period selected for 
investigation was the tisite around the birth of the first child, and 
thus the transition to parenthood.
In response to evidence of a need in the literature, a model was 
derived to both describe and explain the changes over this period.
The model of change was based on the findings of. Janis (1958), in 
terms of preparation for change, and regression in the face of stress, 
as well as the theory of "romantic solutions" to transitional periods 
(Becker, 1973) and the cyclicity of the romantic experience 
(Livingston, 1980). The model was integrated with tije sociological 
model of LaRossa and laRossa (1981), to form a more canprehensive 
description and explanation of the process of the ■ transition to 
parenthood. ;
The first aim in the study was to describe and predict adult and 
couple functioning on the basis of the model of thi Transitional 
Space, with special reference to the changepoint of the transition to
Six couples were studied in depth, with a qualitative methodology. 
Projective interpretation of the responses on the TAT (Morgan and 
Murray, 1935), the Marital Satisfaction Sentence Ccnpletion Technique 
(Inselberg 1961), and the Sentence Ccnpletion Test for Measuring %go 
Devel^ nssr' {Laevinger et al., 1970) were used, together with other 
projective material that was collected. These couples were tested
at about f^ ye months of pregnancy, and again about six months after 
the birth of the babies. On the basis of the responses on these 
tests at the first testing, their positions on the dimensions of the 
Transitional Space were derived, and predictions made on the basis of 
each of their marital configurations as to hew they would negotiate 
the transition to parenthood. It was found that botn the
descriptions with respect to tiie aspects of the Transitional Space, as 
well as the predictions based on these dimensions were accurate and 
useful. Thus it was concluded that the hypothetical construct of the 
Transitional Space provides a clear useful and predictive
understanding of both individual and couple functioning, particularly 
over a changepoint sucjh as the birth of a first child.
The second aim in the study was to assess tkfi Significance of the 
transition to parenthood as a developmental changepoint.
Three groups of parents with fifteen coupler in each group, were 
studied. One group had a six week old, a second' a six month old, and a 
third, an eight year old first child. On the Relationship Change 
Scale (Schlein and Guemey, 1977), all the groups acknowledged a 
significant change in their lives and relationships at this time. For
most of the people, the change was ■ seen to be a positive one, 
particularly for the motiiers of the eight year old first children.
On the basis of the findings in this part of the study, the proposed 
mcdel of change was re-examined and reformulated with the addition of 
further information. , s
The final aim in the study was made up of tvto parts i.
(a) to design and run an intervention aimed at facilitating" a 
successful transition to parenthood.
(b) to describe the ctf • ferences in the way intervention and 
non-intervention groups negotiated the transition to paranthocd. a.
A course, based on psychological, principles- ^Jd and run
thzee times, with twelve two J-jour sessions in each-xcourse, fer a total 
of twenty couples. - x
The intervention was designed, based broadly withis the framework 
of Erikson's DevelopTOuM'Al theory (1980), and more specifically on 
the basis of the unders? ”ing of the model of the Transitional Space, 
and the model of change. Responses to a questionnaire -.assessing the 
usefulness and enjoyment of the course was studied^ . anc( ideas gained 
for future improvements in the course,
he second part of the aim, a description of th t different groups' 
negotiation of the transition to parenthood, "-u conducted on the 
basis of scores and self-report measures on a nuf'.-f ■ cv'scales on tlie 
one hand, and by using the descriptive data ger>-v:ty.-l in the course,
As people chose nether to attend the course or not, the groups were 
not randomly selected from a population. The outcome of self 
selection of the groups, was that distinct groups emerged, with the 
non-intervention groups being typically traditional in outlook and 
practice, and the intervention groups being non-traditional. The 
resultant understanding of the dj tferenceg between the groups provided 
an explanation of the different ways the individuals and couples 
negotiated the transition to parenthood.
In addition to the quantitative evaluation of these groups, a 
qualitative evaluation was made in terns of the concept of the 
transitional Space. Further support was found for the explanatory and 
predictive value of the concept of the Transitional Space in terms of 
the groups, their marital dynamics, and their transition to 
parenthood.
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Transition to parenthood, a period .in the life of an adult 
and the time at which the family is born, straddles many 
possible fields of psychological and sociologylal interest and 
research, ranging from the deeply persona^  intrapsychic, to 
family, behavioural, and social. The essence of this thesis 
attempts to provide an understanding of the transition to 
parenthood as an aspect of adult functionirg, 'Hie general 
perspective is a psychological one, studying the individual from 
the intrapsychic, the observable and the snpi^ rical angles, all 
set within the context of his/her environment, j A hypothetical 
construct, termed the Transitional Space, ia postulated to 
understand and explain the course and variation of individual 
and couple response to the transition to parenthood, while 
certain aspects of this transition are empirically investigated.
For a full understanding of the field and the place of 
this work in the field, it is important to view this study 
within a context, and demonstrate how this study naturally 
evolves out of its context.
There are two interdependent and yet separate contextual 
aspects of this study. There is, on the one hand, the aspect 
of the history and developing theoretical models in psychology; 
on the other, there is the methodological framework and its 
currently changing face.
a w *  #mj'
'file historical context allows for an understanding of the
development of the theory, and also provides a perspective on 
ttie evolution of advances in the theory.
The history of the concept of life cycle derives
originally from Sigmund Freud himself and what he termed "depth
psychology." Freud showed hew personality development in 
childhood, profoundly influences one's life in adulthood. 
Adulthood itself was not seen as a period of further
development, rather as a period during which early unconscious 
conflicts were re-enacted. Jung, a disciple of Freud's, formed 
his own school - MAnalytic psychology" in which he focussed 
particular attention on adult development. Jung set out to 
develop a social psychology that understands individual 
development as a product of both intrapsychic processes and 
environmental and cultural forces. Erik Erikson is another 
important figure in life cycle development. He was the first 
theorist to include the concept of adult development in his 
theoretical propositions. Erikson's eight stages of development 
(1973) stress the importance of conflict and the concept of the 
’ changing organism developing in a changing social and historical 
context.
Following on from Erilcson in the work on the adult life 
cycle, is • Levinson (1978). Levinson's approach makes use of 
the Eriksonian perspective, but it shifts the focus from the 
intrapsychic. Fran Levinson's perspective, the concept of life
structure is cantered more directly on the boundary between self 
and the outside world. It gives equal consideration to self 
and world'as aspects of life as it is lived.
The present work follows in the tradition of Freud, Jung, 
Erikson, and Levinson in that it proposes an integration of both 
the self and the world as the experience and context Of life. 
It. also follows the post Freudian shift, of Erikson, Peris, 
Berne and others, who all operate from a dynamic developmental 
unjerstarriing, while at the same time moving beyond it. The 
descriptive clinicians, Such as Berne and Karls, revolutionized 
the thinking in psychology. in describing hew people relate to 
each other, they describe not only intrapsychic functioning, but 
interpersonal functioning as well.
With respect to. the growing theory iii developmental 
psychology today, many of the main theorists are primarily 
clinicians, and the main movements come from. clinical insights 
rather than laboratory studies. It is fundamental to acknowledge 
the importance and pride of place in which laboratory research 
stands in the testing of hypotheses. However, it is in the 
heuristic value of being "in the field", and thus in the 
derivation of theories, that clinical insights are esteemed. 
Although, amongst the clinicians, Jung and Erikson both moved 
away from the pathological perspective of the clinician and 
concentrated on normal development, the clinical aspect of their 
professions both informed, and were informed by, the theoretical 
aspects. The involvement in therapy provides the forum in
utich theories may be observed in action, as well as the 
hothouse for the generation of new theories based on clinical 
observation and practice. Thus there is real value in the 
constant interplay between the theoretical and the clinical. 
In the words of Winnicott - "Psychoanalysis goes on where 
physiology leaves off. It extends the scientific territory to 
over the phenomena of human personality, human feeling and 
human conflict" (1961, p.13)
One of the basic tenets of developmental and analytic 
psychology is that the life cycle is an organic whole, that each 
period contains all the others and that each subsequent period 
is built on that achieved in the previous periods. Also 
understood, is that problems and unresolved conflicts from 
earlier periods will influence the potential for dealing with 
subsequent stages of development. The implication that derives 
from this holistic understanding, and a significant 
consideration in the development of Freudian as well as later 
analytic theory, is the importance of early child development in 
laying a healthy context for later development.
A clinician/ theoretican who has made a major 
contribution to the understanding of early development is Donald 
Winnicott. A child psychiatrist in the Freudian and Kleinian 
tradition, he developed his theories of infant and child 
development on the basis of observations of infants and children 
and their caretakers, as well as observations made during the
:
%'f:
course of psychoanalysis of patients of all ages. Winnicott 
died without canpleting the development of his theories; 
theories that are rich in observation and understanding of the 
process cf early child development and functioning. His 
perspective begs elaboration, particularly as the implications 
of those theories must reverberate through the life cycle.
In the present work the model that will be presented, is 
based on the original concepts of Winnicott and developed, not 
only in terms of its relevance for infant or child development, 
but for development over the entire life cycle. This model, 
will be described and its use evaluated in terms of enhancing 
the understanding of adult development. Both the description 
and the understanding of the model will be set within the 
context of the epigenetic approach of Erik Erikson (1980).
Concurrent with the evolution of the developmental 
perspective in psychology, was the progress in the behavioural
perspective. The behavioural perspectiv led to the
development of the mechanistic model which views human 
development as the product of a series of lawful events which
impinge on the organism and determine its progress. The
organismic model on the other hand, views development primarily 
as a result of inner processes of the organism. The 
dialectical model reflects a synthesis of the two opposing
models of human development: namely the mechanistic and the
6organismic models. The dialectical model, with its perspective 
of synthesis, then, encourages a search for causes of 
development in events that occur both inside the organism and in 
the world around it.
Thus fran the dialectical model, development occurs 
through interactions between a changing system in the organism 
and a changing world, as a response to some, disharmony. Jung, 
Erikson, Levinson, Winnicott, Peris and Berne may all be said to 
follow the dialectical model, in their perspective on 
development and functioning.
Allegiance to one or tire other of the two opposing models, 
either the mechanistic or the organic models has implications 
for the perspective on research, both in terms of the subject 
matter for valid research and the possible ways of collecting 
data. While the mechanistic model suggests the use of 
empirical quantitative methods alone, the organic model tends 
towards t acceptance of qualitative data.
Concern with the field of scientific enquiry leads into 
the other important contextual aspect for this work, which has 
to do with the approach to data collection and theory 
building. There are two main perspectives in the approach to 
data collection and theory building. On the one hand, there 
are those who support the view that it is not possible to talk 
about the construction of a general theory until an adequate 
data base has been compiled. On the other hand, there are 
tiiose who believe that the pursuit of data without theory is
likely to be painfully slow at best, fruitless or wandering at 
worst (Stevens-long, 1984), The former group are those who 
support the exclusivity of the empir,tcal paradigm, whilst the 
latter group Represent those who are interested in the 
possibilities of qualitative research.
Traditionally, academic institutions have held a position 
in support of the exclusivity of the traditional empirical 
paradigm, however, presently, a change in perspective is taking 
place. There have been increasing influences from paradigm 
shifts in the fields of physical and atomic science, with the 
demonstration by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle of the 
limits of a deterministic interpretation of the physical 
universe (Capra 1983),
The formulation and construction of this present work, 
calls for a shift from the exclusive perspective of the 
traditional scientific paradigm into which psychology has for 
many years attempted to fit itself. Paradigms are said to 
impose order upon a basically random order of phenomena 
(Whitehead 1926) and serve as a "prism" through which certain 
phenomena are included ’ for inquiry, while certain are 
excluded. This schema directs the attention of researchers to 
certain groupings and correlations of data that are themselves 
amenable to that kind of investigation, and the results of that 
predetermined investigation verify the paradigm. Whitehead 
points out that the narrow efficiency of the scheme is the very
cause of its "supreme methodological success". Every time a
new paradigm is adopted, however, it produces a shift ;Ln the
problems recognized as available for scientific inquiry, and in
what constitutes a valid solution. These shifts in
perspective transform the scientific world view in a profound
way. Resistance to such pervasive alterations in world vim is
inevitable. The process of resistance to such alterations is
described by MJhn (1962),
Novelty emerges Jhly with difficulty, manifested by resistance against a backdrop provided by expectation. Initially, only the anticipated and usual are experienced, even under circumstances where anomaly is later to be observed. The later awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the initially anomalous has become the anticipated.
(p. 64)
In effect, then, a paradigm is an agreed upon set of
expectancies that excludes other possibilities, and a revision 
of that paradigm introduces a new order of possibilities.
The reemergence of the call for qualitative research is an 
example of the paradigm shift that is presently taking place in 
the human sciences. The call for qualitative research is a’so 
evolving out of the emergence of the dialectical model for 
understanding life cycle development.
Support for qualitative research comes from Wiseman
(1984), Hill (1981), Aldous (1981), Handel (1985) LaRossa (1985)
amongst others. Hill, (1981) describes how research is turning 
away from large scale definitive studies to more exploratory 
descriptive research involving small, nonrepresentative samples.
He suggests that it is a positive rather than negative shift, 
particularly from its value as a heuristic tool.
Qualitative data, in its richness, provides abundant
material for the generation of hypotheses, but is always prone
to the criticism that, from the almost limitless variety of 
experience available, the observer will choose observations that 
support rather than test attractive hypotheses, and that
objectivity will therefore be lost. It is thus the supportive 
balance between qualitative and quantitative research that Will 
yield the most fruitful perspective on all fronts.
After an evaluation of quantitative versus qualitative 
research in family studies, laRossa & Wolf (1985), conclude that 
both qualitative and quantitative research have a place in the 
social sciences and neither can supersede the other. This 
conclusion acknowledging the value of both qualitative and 
quantitative research is embraced in this study.
The hypothetical construct postulated in this work, that 
of the Transitional Space, is set within the dialectical model, 
where the dialectical, model posits a state of a changing 
organism within a changing environment, as a response to some
disharmony. It is also set within the developmental framework, 
and is conceptualized within the bounds of the empirical data 
that have been derived with respect to the transition to
parenthood. On the basis of the literature, hypotheses have
been derived and tested, within the empirical paradigm.
Hie essence of this stuSy, however, does not reflect the
testing of hypotheses, or the validation of a model. It is
rather a proposal for the operationalization of a construct;
the proposition of a model to-descadbe tooth, the process and the
variation in the process of the trui sition to parenthood. It
is formulated, in this way in response to the lack of explanatory
data in the literature. It is not within the scope of this
study to validate this construct. However, this construct is
qualitatively described with reference to couples observed
during the transition fc. parenthood, and formulated in such a
way that it may be empirically tested in the future.
The theory, as derived in this work, may be criticized as
not being a corprehensive rigorous explanation of human
beiiaviour, yet its strength lies in its value as a useful guide
or tool in the future growth of the field.
Iheory is, then, a tool as well as a goal. It canorganize and integrate existing knowledge. In fact, at this stage, the best criterion for the importance or excellence of a theory may be hew useful it is, rather than how thoroughly it explains human development.(Stevens-lmg, 1234. p. 54)
Thus it is to the genesis ana derivation of the construct of the 
Transitional Space to which the major part of this work is 
directed. The aim is to root it firmly in the understanding of 
dynamic processes, and to support it on the basis of the 
theoretical ana empirical work on which it is founded.
The next chapter on self (ego identity and ego 
development) is the basis for the development of the construct 
of the Transitional Space. 'flie following chapters on self and 
others (contact and intimacy) and change, provide the framework 
within which to illustrate the functioning of the Transitional 
Space within relationships, and relevant to change. Finally, 
the chapter on the transition to parenthood .places the construct 
of the "transitional; -Space-axii-rthe--understanding, of the. process 
of change, within the context of the developmental changepoint 
around the birth of a first child.
2.1 identity
It is both important and necessary to understand the concept of 
identity in the study of individual development and functioning, 
as identity is a core element in early and later development, 
and underlies much of adult functioning. This period of time, 
around the change from a marriage to a family, is the point at 
which both men and women actually change their identities frcsn 
husband and wife to that of parents. It is a transition that 
is enforced by the circumstances of the birth of the child; and 
there is very little information on how adults react to this 
transition to parenthood at a deeper level; to the
incorporation of the role of parent into identity (Whitboume 
and Weinstock, 1979).
Identity is an aspect of the self, and the self has been 
the major interest of the ego psychologists; whereas the 
developing self is the concern of theorists who are interested 
in variety of functioning from a developmental rather than a 
pathological perspective.
TWo theorists who have made major contributions to the 
developmental field are Erik Srikson and Jane loevinger. 
Erikson's contribution is mainly a theoretical one based on his 
clinical and crosscultural observations and described and 
developed in great detail. Loevinger, on the other hand, 
derived and rigorously tested a measure of ego development.
Erikson, a psychoanalyst and professor of developmental 
psychology at Harvard University, has made his major
contribution in describing the psychosocial development of the 
ego. He is a true Freudian in the sense that he accepted and 
built on traditional Freudian theory, without questioning the 
fundamental tenets. He developed the theory by focussing cn 
the ego, and stressing the psycho-social aspects of human 
development and functioning. In his description of the stages 
of the life cycle, he has "advanced psychoanalytic theory to the 
point where it can now describe the development of the healthy 
personality on its own terms and not merely as the opposite of a 
sick one." (Elkind, 1982 p.13).
Although only one of the eight stages of development,'Erikson 
viewed the identity crisis as pivotal. In many instances, in 
fact, Erikson comments that identity has been viewed as the 
teleolcgical aim in growing up, the end-point at which to aim, 
the attainment of which would result in that elusive "happiness" 
that is sought by so much of mankind.
Erikson conceptualized identity, similarly to the other 
stages of development, as beginning its evolution in the very
early stages of infancy, and continuing its development all 
through both child and adult life. The question, or rather the 
response to the question, "Who am I, and what is my meaning in
life?" is dealt with from preverbal stages right up until
death. However, it is at the stage that Erikson terms the
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crisis of Identity Achievement vs Identity Diffusioryconfusion 
that the issues of identity are foremost. Thus Erikson 
differentiates between identity formation which takes place
throughout life, and the identity crisis of late adolescence and 
early adulthood.
In discussing the difference between identity crisis and
identity formation Erikson says,
While the end of adolescence thug is the stage of an overt identity crisis, identity formation neither begins nor ends with adolescence: it is a lifelong developmentlargely unconscious to the individual and his society. Its roots go back all the vray to the firstself-recognition: in the baby's earliest exchange ofsmiles there is something of a self realization coupled 
with a mutual recognition (Erikson, 1968, p. 23)When describing identity formation, he contends that "the
process "begins" somewhere in the first true "meeting" of mother
and baby as two persons who can touch and recognize each other,
and it does not "end" until a man's power of mutual affirmation
wanes" (1980, p.122).
A main cor-sem in this work is with identity formation and
the effects of this identity on the developing adult.
The concept of identity is very broadly and inclusively
denoted. Erikson has been criticized for avoiding a clear
definition, although the futility of a simple definition is
recognized, with respect .to its complexity and .inclusiveness
(Bourne, 1978). This lack of adequate definition represents
both a strength and a weakness in the conceptualization of
identity. On the one hand, the strength appears to be in the
cannon ground of intuitive understanding by academicians, 
clinicians and the lay population. However, on the other hand, 
the avoidance on the part of ttie major theoreticians such as 
Erikson and loevinger, to adequately define the concept, results 
in a series of ciaundststandings; In the non-clarification of 
areas of research, and more generally, the kind of confusion 
that besets anyone attempting to work in this area. It is the 
aim of the present author to highlight seme of the areas of 
confusion, attenpt a level of clarification, i!,reconceptualise 
aspects, and finally to integrate and extend them in the form of 
an explanatory model.
bath ego identity and personal identity.
'"Ihe conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous observations: The immediateperception of one's selfsameness and continuity in time; and the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognise one's sameness and continuity. What I prcposeto call ego identity concerns more than the mere fact of existence, as conveyed by personal identity; it is the ego quality of this existence".(p.22)
So the concept of a sense of personal identity has to do 
with two things; firstly that one is aware of "something that 
is me, that is the same.” This "something that is me that is 
the same" stays and continues over time. The second part is 
that this "something that is me, that is the same" is also 
recognized by others. %is second part of both personal and
In "identity and the Life Cycle" (1980), Erikson describes
ego identity is important to note as it is Erikson's contention 
that one's .personal identity must be recognized by others as 
well as oneself. This is part of the social aspect of
identity.
Personal .Identity is differentiated a sense of ego
identity:
EQo identity then, in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of the fact that there is a selfsameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods and that these methods are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others. (1980, p.32)
In •' -lS definition of ego identity, Sriksen remains loyal 
to the analytic concept of the ego having a synthesizing 
function, and then expands on that notion by describing this 
function as being characteristically different for different 
people; yet for the same person, it is continuous and constaht 
over time. Erikson discriminates between personal identity and 
ego identity by what he calls the ego quality, and terns it, "an 
internalized pattern, a basic ego space, which has determined 
their defense mechanism" (1980, p.32).
In both the above descriptions, Erikson is referring to a 
"subjective1 or "experiential" sense of identity. However, 
even this subjective experience must include the "other" as it 
is primarily in response to the "other" that identity is 
formed. In describing identity formation with this
subjective-objective two way process, Erikson refers to how the
process consists of both reflection and observation occurring 
simultaneously and on all levels of mental functioning, The 
individual, judges viimself as he imagines others judge him. At 
the same tdme, he judges their way of judging him, from his own 
frame of reference. The content of both of these processes is 
always changing in terms of experience and development; a very 
complex two-way process ' that embodies within itself the 
dialectic that is the quality of ego identity.
The dialectic of -"ego identity could be said to be 
characterized by the actually attained, but forever 
to-be-revised, aense of the reality of the Self within social 
reality” (1968, p.211),
Another dialectic that confuses the understanding of the v 
concept of ego .identity is that of its static yet changing 
quality. on the one hard Erikson describes the selfsameness 
and continuity of ego identity, and on the other he talks about 
both the development and the loss or disintegration of ego 
identity (1980). Erikson also refers to the development of ego 
identity to the point where it "acquires its final strength in 
the meeting of mates whose ego identity is complimentary in scare
essential point "(1980 p.40) and on the other, in discussing
therapy, he says "Therapy and guidance may attempt to substitute 
more desirable identifications for undesirable ones, but the 
total configuration of the ego identity remains unalterable" 
(1980 p.26). This statement is one that has vast implications 
for the conceptualization of the aim aivd purpose of
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the therapeutic process. However, if ego identity can and does 
develop and change, and if it also is always the same and 
"unalterable," how does this dialectic function, and what then 
can be the aim of any psychological or therapeutic intervention?
It would appear that, from the Eriksonian perspective, the 
basis, foundation, or giroundplan of ego identity is laid in the
very early months of the life of the infant. It is during this 
period, when the infant far the first time begins to have a 
sense of "self" being separated from "mother" or "other", that 
the first sense of who this self is, begins to be formed. This 
infant antecedent of identity is located within the unconscious 
processes, and in Brikson's terms changes very slowly, if at all 
(1968, p.27). The aspect of the early beginning of separation/
individuation will be dealt with in greater detail below,
suffice it to say, that it is at this stage in the life of the 
infant, depending on the quality of the early mothering, that 
this "unalterable" framework of ego identity is set down. It
is within this framework, that ego identity may now develop and 
grew, but only within the bounds of the particular framework 
that has already been laid. It is also within these boundaries 
that living, as well as the therapeutic process, talces place. 
This is the basis ot1 the "unconscious life plan" (1980 p.36) 
and the "internalized pattern, a basic ego space, which has 
determined their defense mechanism" (1980, p.32} to which 
Erikson refers. It is also this framework that sets the scene
for which personalities, or aspects of personality, the 
developing child will choose to identify with in the process of 
the elaboration of ego identity.
As to the function or‘use of therapy, or any intervention, 
such as the one in this work, its value lies, not in the 
changing of the basic pattern of the ego identity, which Erikson 
deems "unalterable," but rather in freeing the .individual from 
the determinism of the unconscious life plan. This is achieved 
by, firstly, bringing this life plan into awareness so that the 
person is conscious of the way that he/she determines his/her 
life. On the basis of this new awareness, the person would then 
have the autonomy to choose differently and thus to be able to 
change the way they respond to the stimuli that have, for them, 
been problematic.
In sunroary then, from the Eriksonian view, the basis for 
ego identity is set very early on in the infant's life cycle, 
and then, as the child develops and progresses through the 
different stages and deals with the crises of development1,, he 
fills out this framework, thus becoming the person that he. is. 
So it is the basic grourtdplan that is seen as unalterable, while 
the "filling out" of the sense of identity that is alterable.
Crucial to the understanding of Erikson's description of 
development is what he termed the "epigenetic principle." This
f-a-rm is derived from the growth of organisms- in utero, and "this
principle states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and
that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having
it's time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to
form a functioning whole" (1968, p.92.)• With the concept of
maturation, Brikson implies that also here, there is a
sequential unfolding in terms of inner laws of development,
along a set path, the length of which everyone will traverse
through their lifetime,
Personality, therefore, can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the human organism's readiness to be driven forward, to be aware of, and to interact'with awidening radius of significant individuals and institutions." (1968, p.93).
This progression is stage rather than age related. There 
appears to be an interplay between the societal and familial 
demands on a developing person and the stage of maturation that
they reach.. Whereas they need to deal with aspects of each
stage at many ages of development, the particular interface of 
age/stage and societal demands bring each particular crisis to 
the fore at a proper rate and proper sequence despite cultural 
differences.
With reference to the development of the different "items" 
of personality, Brikson writes that every one is related to all 
the others. They al] depend on the proper development in the 
proper sequence of each item. He also emphasizes that each 
item exists in some form before "its"particulur and decisive and 
critical stage arrives. Finally, that each item, must, ft the
advent of succeeding crises, be brought up to th/3 new level of
the then daninant conflict.
It it, it each "critical" time that each item comes to the
.fore and demands attention, in what Brikson teirms the "crisis"
of each develroxental stage. It is this term crisis that
appears to ]-. .ce a lot of misunderstanding, both in the
understanding of Erikson's work and in the use of the term in
other areas of psychological investigation, particularly the one
under present study. In the prologue to "Identity: Youth and
Crisis" (1968), Erikson celebrates the fact that "crisis" no
longer implies inpertiing catastrophe. He says both here, and
later in the book, that- "crisis" is new rather accepted,
in a developmental sense to connote not a threat of catastrophe, but a turning point, a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential, andtherefore, the ontogenetic source of generational strength and maladjustment (p. 96).
These critical stages demand that the individual face and 
resolve ■ a particular crisis, and Erikson describes these 
resolutions in terms of their polar opposites, such as trust vs 
mistrust; identity vs diffusion or confusion. Further he 
discusses the virtues that result out of the posj Sive resolution 
of these crises, such as hope; will; purpose? fidelity; care and 
others. The process of the resolution of these crises is also 
important to understand in the conception of Erikson's model. 
In the struggle to deal with the particular crisis at hand, 
Erikson does not postulate the achievement of a total victory of 
the positive polar opposite over the other, but simply a dynamo
"versus" is an interesting little word,-because it can mean . . a reciprocal antagonism Carried feather in "vice versa." Develcpnentally it suggests-, a . dialectic dynamic, in that 
the final strength postlilatfcd could not emerge without ... _ either of the contending qualities? yet to assure grcwth,- tiie syntonic,.. the one more intent on adaptation, must . ^ r^- ahaorfc the dystonj's (1978, p.26).
IlLikscn contirmftB to descr-ibe how the struggle remains
persistant and p ..stage is never once and for all "attained" but
neetis to be fcoifinned-^ gtri recc/nfirraed at many different 
. I I ' |1 ' ■’ ••••a ^pedr.tii'. >" In ji effect., Mien, as q]escribed. and reaffirmed by
;S.rik5or., / nobcdy Alfa . is "neatly located in one stage." A
W'. v -of ' someone JLrl liti?. will reflect an oscillation between at
two stagss/'.and a h.j-ze te a Mgher one only when an even
highest. one :cd»=^ ' jtyov .plaV- In fact the "achievement" of an
■cverformul^ ted ^ s e  'l .^‘i ia‘*tity, for example, may hinder the
Sense of ; ’ so iif^ Yctant in the living of a well
adjusted life.; y i, ,
,153 retuni to the concept of identity: The crisis of identity vs
!''ide|itity diffusion or confuyj.onis the fifth stage of 
jde^ /elopnent as described by Erjjcpuj^k .nxl this crisis takes place
// , v ' !during the period of adolescence,. ' "The beginnings of identity 
formation take place during early Infancy, at the first stages 
of differentiating oneself from tbti ether. Erikson terms this 
"Unipolarity vs premature differentiation." Further
differentiation and development take place at every stage of
maturation, culminating in this crisis of adolescence, with the 
attainment of the virtue of "Fidelity." Erikson views fidelity 
as the "ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of 
the inevitable, contradictions and confusions of value systems'1 
(Evans 1969, p. 30). . He sees fidelity as the cornerstone of
identity and it is inspired •:: Nxmfimtifig ideologies and 
affirming companions.
These latter two aspects affirming fidelity and identity, 
refer in detail to Erikson's perspective on the relativity of 
identity to three cycles. The three are: the individual one,
which comprises all the emerging strengths as we;'’, as the 
inhibiting forces within the individual. These interact with:., 
the ge.ierational cycle, the ongoing continuous cycle of
generations, and finally with: the social structures that both 
evolve reciprocally with the individual and social cycles, as 
well as iin.luence them. Identity formation, says Erikson, 
could be conceptualized only as a "psychosocial relativity." 
He emphasizes, tine and again, the importance of the social 
aspects in the formation and maintenance of identity, and refers 
to Freud's description of his own Jewish identity: "the safe 
privacy of a common mental construction" (1968, p.21) that is a 
deep commonality known only to these who share it. Again, in a 
reference to the dimensions of identity, he locates it both in 
the "core" of the individual, and yet also in the "core" of his 
communal culture. ih fact, the core of the context from which 
Erikson views identity, is exenplified in the following
Students of ; society and history, on the other hand, blithely continue to ignore the simple fact that all 
individuals aire bom by mothers? that everybody was once a child? that people and peoples begin in their nurseries? that society consists'"' of generations in the process of developing from children to parents, designed to absorb the historical changes of their lifetimes and to continue to make history for their descendants" (1968, p.45).
i Again, while discussing the approach of psychoanalysis to 
the study of the ego, he criticizes the basic flaw of seeing the 
individual in isolation'
'The resulting methodological divergence has perpetuated in psychoanalytic thought an artificial overdifferentiation between the isolated individual forever projecting his infantile family constellation on to the "outer world", and the "individual-ih-the-ma s s , s u bmerged in: what Freud'"indistinct aggregate " of men. Yet that a n could ever be psychologically alone? that a man "alone" is essentially different from the same man in a group; that a man in a temporary solitary condition- or when closeted with his analyst has ceased to be a "political" animal and has disengaged himself from social action (or inaction) on whatever class level.- - these and similar stereotypes demand careful revision." (1968. p.46)
2.2.4 She <
Although Erikson descri.W carefully and in great detail the ' 
different stages of development in the life cycle, he did not 
attempt to operationalize them. Ihe concept of ego identity, as 
the cornerstone of adult development, demanded the possibility 
of measurement. In 1966, Marcia introduced the "identity 
status" approach, which operationalized Erikson's concepts of 
the resolution to the identity vs diffusion crisis on the basis 
of measure, 'Ihe Identity Status Interview. Since that time
the irity of the empirical work on identity has utilised this
spproadi. Bourne (197S), calculated that out of a total of 
forty studies, seven prior to 1966, employed a paradigm other 
than Marcia's, whereas only four did after 1966. Marcia's 
status approach allows one to describe how an individual is 
faring in the identity crisis, further than simply having 
reached it.
He elaborated on Erikson's original conceptualization of 
identity as being either diffuse or achieved and developed two 
other "statuses," which he termed "foreclosed," and 
"moratorium.11 These identity statuses are seen to b6 on a 
continuum, with diffusion followed by moratorium, followed by 
foreclosed, followed by identity achievement.
The person who is in the "identity diffusion" status, may, 
or may not, have experienced a period or periods of crisis-. He 
shows little or no commitment to a particular pathway, artd with 
little or no interest in making any ccmitroents. Someone in the 
"moratorium" status is presently in the crisis, testing.and 
experimenting with alternatives for commitment.
One who is "foreclosed" has obtained his identity by taking 
over the values of his parents, without much experimentation or 
crisis. And someone ,who is in the "identity achieving" status, 
has forged his own identity after a period of crisis and role 
experimentation.
Marcia (1966), defined identity in terms of the two aspects 
emphasized by Erikson in his description, those being: crisis, 
and ccmitment. Two types of commitment are considered as
relevant by Marcia, namely occupational and ideological, the 
ideological ordken dam into political and religious.
Abundant research has been conducted, using #ie concept o£ 
identity status (Bourne 1978). In general the results 
iliustxata that the identity achievers and msratorium groups are 
relatively achievement oriented, and that they appear to show 
higher levels of intellectual and social competence. 
Foreclosures tshowed parent centered values and high scores on 
authorital'ianiian (Schenkel and Marcia 1972), as well as being 
lowest among the statuses on the Edwards Autonomy Scale 
(Matteson, 1974, Orlofsky et al, 1973). On other measures they 
appeared as 1 well adjusted.11 Among both college men and women 
they were found to be lowest in anxiety (Marcia, 1967; Marcia 
and Friedman, 1970) and Allans and Shea (1979) found that the 
foreclosed subjects appeared;remarkably advances', in terms of ego 
development. it is thus, tjhis foreclosed status group that is 
the most confounding, as in some ways they appear to be well 
adjusted but not in others.
Diffusion status subjects have been found, like the 
foreclosures, to conform iri an authority situation (Tcder and 
Marcia, 1973), and on the whole are found to be exceedingly 
withdrawn (Bourne 1978).
There are a number of shortcomings to the Identity Statuses as 
conceptualized by Marcia (1967). The most evident criticism
rests on Marcia's restriction of the relevant roles in life to 
occupation and ideology. This is both too restricting and does 
not cover relevant areas. Bourne {1978) suggests that an 
Increment in validity would result from enlarging the scope of 
investigation.
It is problematic to conceptualize the identity statuses 
along a continuum as both identity achievement and foreclosure 
indicate a resolution of the identity process. It would thus 
be imperative to view;,the identity resolution process as forming 
a fork somewhere in the moratorium status - as foreclosures may 
or may not have been through sane level of role 
experimentation. I it would appear, therefore, that it might be 
more useful to view the statuses typologically. This 
perspective is supported by Bourne (1978).
:in order to bring the conception of identity statuses closer to 
reality without losing the obvious value, and increased 
understanding found by researchers in the area of ego identity, 
this conceptualization may be extended. Marcia himself (1976b) 
noted •& shortcoming in his identity status approach. It becomes 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make an individual 
fit into any one status. The value would be to be able to 
determine where and how a person fits into any, some or all of 
the statuses, and thus create a profile of an individual at one 
point in time.
An aspect of identity that was clearly spelled out by 
Erikson, was the coiwcant change, negotiation and renegotiation 
of identity. It is this "process" aspect of identity that was
not acknowledged by Marcia in his derivation of the identity
statuses. However in 1976, he clearly recognized this issue,
"Without- belabouring well-worn criticisms of typological approaches, it m y  be productive to begin thinking of identity in terms of ongoing process or dimensions instead of the ide...d.ty status categories and their proliferation,"
- • • • • (p.-154)
It is possible to acknowledge the ongoing process approach 
without sacrificire?value gained fron the status 
perspective, E.. resented an extension of the status
approach that rec&%._ _ , ' the status and the process
perspectives. This conceptualization'noves the image from an
vmidisemimal o^ e, and views it. frem two dimensional 
•perspectives. It - was deeded necessary, in the present
conceptualization, to describe another identity status that had
not been e:ie of Marcia's original or proliferated statuses. 
This status was termed Negative-identity Achieving status. It 
is different from, the diffusion status ih that the person in 
this particular status has been through the moratorium? in a 
sense has struggled with the crisis of identity and has not 
achieved a positive identity. 1 Instead he decides on what 
Erikson terms a "negative Identity." Erikson (1968) describes 
how this identity is formed. The history of this choice would 
have involved,
"a set of conditiofs in which it is easier for the patient to derive a cense of identity out of a total identification with that which he is least supposed to be than to struggle for a feeling of reality in acceptable roles which are unattainable with his inner Treana."(p. 176)
The crucial term here is unattainable. The process through 
which this person has been through is different from that of 
identity diffusion, where engagement in crisis may not have 
occurred. in this case, as is inplied by the term unattainable, 
that engagement, . either in reality or psychologically has
occurred, with failure at the endpoint* It is at this point 
that a "negative identity" is assumed. Orlofsky et al (1973), 
described . and partially validated a new ego identity status, 
which they called "alienated achievement'!.. The depiction of 
this new status fits Erikson's description of negative identity 
and it is difficult to see why this new term was derived. People 
fitting into this category ware found to have a lew need for 
approval? . are self reliant and defiant towards the social order 
and ariventional ways of doing, things, and have the strongest 
need for affiliation, while also probably equalling the identity 
achievement individual in ego strength and ego resolution.
Another important asper.4- of - extending the 
conceptualization of ego statuses into a two dimensional one, is 
that not only can one look at identity status at a point in 
time, but also over time? not only can one view overall 
identity, but the different facets that go to make up the 
overall picture of identity. So a researcher may study 
identity as it is reflected at a point in time .vnd also how it 
changes over time.
The one Identity Status that is not included in the 
proposed model as a status in itself, is the "status" "in 
moratorium." The reason behind its exclusion is that, in as
much as identity itself is often regarded as a concept in 
process and changing ever time, " in moratorium" is the only 
"status" that can be regarded as totally process. It can only
really be conceptualized as being in process from somewhere to 
somewhere else, but not as a status in and of itself. Marcia, 
(1976) deals with this issue with respect to all the identity 
statuses and states that any adequate theory of identity should 
have descriptive terms that take movement into account. He 
suggests that even a foreclosure should be described as coming 
from someplace and going to someplace. If that person is 
actively in movement, however, he may, in fact, be considered to 
be "in moratorium".
Moratorium, therefore may be considered to be the condition 
of movement that an individual needs to engage in, in order to 
resolve or re-resolve, at any point of development, the crisis 
of identity. It is not a status. So an individual may ba 
referred to as being in moratorium, for example, from a diffused 
to a foreclosed identity status.
A placement at any time, but more specifically at a time 
wlen an individual is in a moratorium, needs to be varied enough 
to establish how far into a category he can be placed. It is 
therefore necessary to have some measure of achievement of that 
particular category. So that it may be possible to say that an 
individual is highly identity achieving, or minimally so? that 
a person is highly foreclosed, or only so in sane aspects while 
in others only minimally so..and so forth.
It is all these facets of identity and its statuses that are 
illustrated in the model derived below;
FORECIOSURE
rigid . stable achievement attained- no engagement with crisis
ACHIEVINGflexible
achievement attained- after crisis
AVOIDING FACO'J.'
3RTUK
IBEOTITY PIFFCJSION
flexible rigidunstabl.e unstableno crisis engagemant- engagement witli crisis-no achievement no achievement
NO CCMMnMENT
Thus one may graphically represent an individual's position with 
respect to identity status. It is also possible to compare the 
position of people on the graph in terms of their identity
IDEMTK, DIFFUSION
flexibleunstableno crisis engagement- no achievemsnt
IDENTITYACHIEVING.flexibleiblelievemenfc attained- after crisis
unstableengagement with crisis- no achievement
NO CCWMTIMENr
In the above diagram, different ro3.es in identiL/ are reflected 
by the positioning of dots, making up a scatter diagram. This 
provides a much more realistic picture of identity, than 
assuming it to be a unitary phenomenon.
Another aspect where this diagram may be used, is in the 
change in identity status over time. As Identity is neither a 
unitary nor static concept, it is useful to be able to 
illustrate both its variance and its movement.
iv;>
=d theory of the development of 
toevingar et al (1966) not only 
sgo development, but have also
Another psycho-analytically bas 
the ego, is that of Xcevinger. 
developed a stage theory of 
operationalized the theory and produced a test. As these
stages of ego development and theory of the development of the 
ego differ from Erikson's, it is useful to understand both the 
similarities and differences in approach.
Loevinger refers to her concept of ego development as the 
master trait. She declares that it is second only to
intelligence in accounting for human variation. As such it is 
of primary importance to investigate this facet of personality 
and attempt to account for it in the investigation of responses 
to a particular set of changes. In fact Loevinger, in a 
similar yet even more evasive stance than Erikson, also refuses 
to make a formal definition of ego development. She asserts 
that it is more usefu. to understand it partly from the common 
domain, partly from other writers, and then adjust and correct 
one's understanding through one's experiences and frcm other 
sources.
Ice<dnger asserts that to be a scientist it is not good 
enough to have theory and data, or wen to have good theory and 
sound data. The nub of the scientific approach, she contends, 
is the constructive interconnection between then, that is, a 
systematic program for correcting revising, and expanding 
theoretical conceptions in response to enpirical studies.
She criticizes the reification of the hypothetico-deductive
approach as the pinnacle of scientific method. Her major
thesis (1978) is that data should shape theories, in a similar
way to that of how the infant's encounters with his environment
shape Me. actum!,       .
Loevinger (1966) proceeds to describe what ego development
is "not." It is not the same as development of all functions of
the ego, and in particular not intellectual development, even
though the exercise of intelligence is an ego function, and.
although intellectual development is seen to vary concomitantly
with ego development. It is not a function of age and is seen
to vary almost independently of ager although it has been often
noted that, at higher age levels' there seems to be. a higher
-level of ego development. loevinger states that,
"What is conrnm to the developmental sequence and the characterolcgy is an abstraction. TO this abstraction and only to this is the term ego development most appropriately applied. "(1966, p.196)
She distinguishes, not only between ego development and 
intellectual development, bat also between ego development and 
psychosexual development, and ego development and adjustment, 
loevinger asserts that in order to differentiate ego level frcro 
intellectual level, from psychosexual level and from adjustment, 
it is necessary to have very clear conceptual distinction 
between them. While calling for this clarification, she does 
not effect it; nevertheless she continues to describe the 
concept in terms of these conceptualizations that are as yet not 
discreetly defined.
After describing what the concept is not,. Loevipger notes 
what it is. In effect, she says it is what, ic is! ,She describes 
the concept in terms of the continuum of differentiation and 
ccsrplejdty that she and her colleagues have delineated as the 
stages -of ego, development, . /nWg J.ts..r.-*muteiagc*M^ deaad.pti&n 
and does not qualify to stand as a de.tiiU’tioq.;,^ HavSi^ g^  snid that, 
however, she then ascribes the construct to a collates, .Tastfed 
together from many sources "all of them have been concerned with 
the abstract junction of a developmental sequence and character 
typology" (p..198, 1966).
The developmental sequence referred to above, is again 
duplicated in a further attempt at refining the understanding of 
ego development. loevinger asserts that the use of the term ego 
development to cover all of the ego functions does not stand, as 
many of the ego functions develop at different rates, and not as 
an "organic unity."
.. "only those ego functions that are part of that organic unity 
are properly included in the definition." (1966, p 205). So, 
what is then krown is that it embodies functions of the ego 
that develop together as well as charset.' , typology.
In describing ego function loevinger (1969, p.85) writes,
"The striving to master, to integrate, to make sense of 
experience is not one ego function among many, but the essence 
of the ego." It may be concluded, therefore, that these three 
facets could be assumed to represent the underlying constancy in 
ego development, reflected in the individual's integrative
O: ■ J
and overall frame of referance. In a critical review 
of Lcevinger's model and measure of egq. develcixnent, Hauser 
(1976) notes that her conception of ego development assumes that 
each person has a customary orientation, to himself and to the 
vjrlei -’which is arranged • along s the
nore advanced representing an increasing differentiation of 
ones's self, of the social world, and. of the relations.of one's 
feelings and thoughts to those of others.
"Thus the search for coherent meanings in experience is the essence of the ego or of ego functioning. Ihe ego maintains its stability, its identity a M  its coherence by selectively gating out observations inconsistent with its current state." (Hauser 1970, p.8)
Ego development takes place in the order of a hierachical model,
(Tanner and Inhtilder 1956? 1960). loevinger describes the
stages of development as having an invariable order? that no
stage can be skipped; that each stage is more complex than the
preceding one; and that each stage is based on the preceding
one and prepares for the succeeding one. The diverse aspects of
each stage have a single organic unity that develops through
organically related steps, and this organic unity is the
organizing principle that is ego development. An individual
may not develop beyond a certain stage, and individuals at each
particular stage ray be characterized with respect to the
specific features of the stags they have reached, thus
generating a typology of character s
in terms of reaching higher stage
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imply better adaptation, and it is quite possible that 
individuals at scsne of the lower _■•••• jJ may be considered to be 
better adjusted and "happy" than others at the higher levels.
Trie stages succeed each other as milestones in development, 
as distinct-frcsr. polar5 aspects. Lcevingsr describes milestones 
as "observable behaviours that tend to rise and fall in 
prominence as one ascends the scale of ego maturity,1 (1966, 
p.202} <\nd may be illustrated by a bell-shaped curve. With 
.milestones, the rating is a qualitative, rather than a 
quantitative one with each- successive point along the scale 
being rated as qualitatively different fran the others. In 
terms of maturation, milestones develop dialectically, whereas 
polar aspects develop non-dialectically.
A description of the stages will illustrate their 
conceptualization and evolution:
She first stage (1-1) has two phases: Uie presccial phase 
is where the infant is oblivious to all but the gratification of 
his immediate needs. inanimate wxL animate parts of the
environment: are not distinguished ‘ The symbiotic phase is 
when the infant has a strong attachment to the mother, 
distinguishing her from the rest of his environment, but not yet 
distinguishing himself fran her.
Both phases of this stage are preverbal, ■ and are therefore 
inaccessible to study using techniques that' require ] --vguage.
The second stage (1-2) is the impulsive stage, and is 
characterized by impulsive behaviour. Control over inpulses is 
regarded as defective or undependable? rules are unrecognized
and behaviour is seen to, be "bad" or "good" simply because it is 
punished or rewarded. Physical needs, particularly sexual and 
aggressive, are the preoccupation of individuals at this stage.
The first step in the direction of the control of impulses 
is termed self protective (Delta): Rules are recognized, but
are obeyed in terms of self interest and expediency and 
immediate advantage. Interpersonal relations are exploitive and 
manipulative, but with less dependency. Conscious preoccupations 
are with control, getting into trouble, domination and
deception.
Delta/3 is a transitional phase between delta and 1-3, the 
self protective and conformist stages, and described by 
responses given on the stems not being complex enough to receive 
a higher rating, nor impulsive enough to receive a lower rating.
The third stage is the conformist stage (1-3): Rules are
obeyed just because they are rules. Disapproval and shame for 
the transgression of rules play an important role for this 
individual. Interpersonal relations are viewed in terms of 
actions and concrete events rather than feelings, or other 
abstractions. Conscious preoccupation is with material things, 
and inner states are expressed in cliches.
The transition between the conformist and conscientious 
stages is (1-3/4)z The context of an action is now seen to
define its rectitude. There is the beginning of an emergence 
of introspection, and understanding of psychological causation, 
self awareness and self criticism. Ths outside group also no 
longer provides the absolute guidelines for behaviour.
The fourth stage (I--4) is the conscientious stage. Here 
morality. is new internalized. Inner rules are considered to be 
more valuable than outer pressures. Guilt is the punishment
for transgression, and interpersonal relationships ars seen in 
terms - of feelings and motives. Cbnscious preoccupation; have to 
do with obligations, ideals traits and achievements, defined by 
inner standards; and the capacity for self criticism has 
developed.
Ttie third transitional sta n^ is (1-4/5). Individuals'at
this stage have far more complex responses than those at earlier 
stages. They display the beginnings of the capacity to 
tolerate paradoxical relationships between events, and
interpersonal interactions in themselves have become highly
The fifth stage is the Autonomous stage (1-5). It is at 
this stage that both facing and coping with conflict at many 
levels becomes the primary concern, there is an increased 
toleration for the choices and solution of others and a 
recognition of mutuality, as well as the other persons need for 
autrAomy, Conscious preoccupation is around complexity of 
options, role differentiation, individuality and self 
fulfillment.
The six and highest stage is the integrated one (1-6). At 
this stage the individual is beyond coping with conflicts, is 
concerned more with the reconciliation of conflicting demands, 
and where necessary the renunciation of the unattainable. 
There is a real appreciation of individual differences.
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Having described loevinger's main stages it is new relevant 
to compare her ideas with those of Eriksm.
As it is usually assumed that Erikson and Loevinger are 
examining the same abstraction .from a differer,c perspective, it 
behooves a researcher to understand both the similarities and 
the differences in these tu. approaches.
The epigenetic principle, as expressed by Etikson, envisages 
development as "a gradual unfolding of the personality throu^ i 
phase-specific pschosocial crises" (1980, p.130). He sees each 
part as existing in some form before the time that :it becomes
phase-specific. The time at which each part .becomes
phase-specific is precipitated by the interaction of the 
individual being ready and the society exerting pressure. 
Erikson contends that each part is systematically related to all 
the others, as each depends on the proper development at the 
proper time of the others. The idiosyncratic or
characterolcgical aspect of each individual is reflected in the 
interaction between individual make-up and societal pressures, 
which determine the rate of development of each and thus the 
ratio of them all.
The hierarchical model, however, whilst also asserting that 
there is an invariable order to the stages, none of which can be 
skipped and that each prepares for the successive and is 
prepared for by the succeeding one, is different in a basic 
aspect. That aspect has to do with where an individual may be
placed in the order of the stages. Loevinger states that in
the hierarchical model there is one and only one characteristic
-"I
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level for each person. So an individual may be placed at only 
one level, that being regarded as his characteristic level. 
The stages of ego development from the hierarchical perspective 
ts?Y be regarded as developing along a unilinear (Werner,1 1057) 
continuum, as one organic whole that is inseparably. . Hewever 
from the epigenetic viewpoint one may be simultaneously at 
different levels. Erikson has stated that one tray cling to the 
mode of one period while proceeding to the next, and?also that 
even though a solution is found at the time of crisis, that 
solution may only be "more or less lasting" ( 19.59, p.130). At 
many points Brikson is careful to point out that an individual 
needs, at every level, to rework aspects of the previous level, 
and all of them exist from early life in seme form. He describes
Each stage becomes a crisis because the incipient growth and awareness in a new part function go together with a shift in instinctual energy and yet also cause a specificvulnerability in that part" (1968, p.95)
That, together with the demand from the environment to deal with 
this aspect, produces the task oriented, solution directed 
perspective, that is the multilinear (Werner, 1957) approach. 
It is Werner's contention, however, that behaviour is both 
unilinear and multilinear, being that it reflects both the 
epigenetic and the hierarchical models, ara research in both 
these areas with their own respect: - •" . ,v and weaknesses
has validity. /
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The mnseptualization of ego identity and edjo development is 
of scare interest. As discussed previously, both Erikson and 
Lcevinger have avoided giving clear definitions of their 
constructs. Howe\ac it is possible fran the intimations and
references, to derive a sense of what each of then is meaning, 
and how they are different gnd similar.
As referred to prevj/Dusly, toevinger's perspective on ego
development views it as the striving to master, to integrate, to 
make sense of experience, as reflected in the individual's 
integrative processes and overall frame of reference. This 
perspective is not dissimilar to Erikson zs description of
identity. IMs overall frame of reference that Hauser (3.976) 
describes as a customary orientation to himself and the world, 
can clearly be related to Erikson's description of 11 a
subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity", or 
the "style of one's individuality" (1968, p.50). Again the
depiction of the integrative of the ego by Loevinger,
may be related to Erikson's descn^ e.'-^p- of the ego as capable of 
" integrating affective steps tcwarti a tangible future, (1968, 
p.50) and his continued emphasis on tt.a essence of the ego being 
its "synthesizing methods."
The final aspect of the ego that she describes is its 
striving to mastery. This would relate very well to Erikson's 
perspective on progress in ego development as reflecting the 
ability to solve the problems or resolve the crises at each
developmental level. However, despite this description, 
Loevinger warns that.
There is a temptation to see the successive stages of ego development as problems to be solved, and to assume that the best adjusted people are those at the highest stage. This is a distortion. There are probably well adjusted people at all stages" (loevinger et al 1970 Manual, p.7),,.
She suggests that it is moire realistic to see''the sequence as
one of coping with increasingly deeper problems rather than the
successful negotiations of solutions. Despite this stated
difference, it is obvious from the above, that what ioevinger
describes as Ego development is not dissimilar, in fact
resembles very closely what Erikson calls the development of ego
identity. In another description, Itisvinger .spells out the
specific facets that develop with " - . a^neht,, namely,
impulse control/ character devalopmeriif/ _ interpersonal
relations? and conscious pr^ccupata <is with self including
self-concept. Again if Erikson's stages of' developnent are
studied, it m y  be observed that the aspects that are described
by toevingr ’ are certainly covered by Erikson, be they
semantically cWtinct.
Where they clearly do differ* however, is in the
understanding of the formation, or actual process of the
development of the ego. On the one harvi, 15he overall picture is
the same. Loevinger sees ego deveiwnent to be marked by "a
more differentiated perception of r. ■o'• -aaLf, of the social
world, and of the relations of one-'.- t-Alings..afiti-thoughts to
those of others" (Candee, 1974), wfr: i iiyikson views it as "a
progression through time of a differentiation of parts" (1980,
p.54). it is rather the process of how this increasing
differentiation or differentiated perce-'tion takes place, and.
the path that it takes that are the points at which the two
theorists diverge.
As itisntioned above Erikson sees the path of development as 
an epigenetic one, with a multilinear format, whilst Loevinger 
sees it as a hierachical one, with a continuum along a unilinear 
format, with each successive stage being qualitatively different 
from the preceding one.
Erikson sees the development to be presumed from the 
successive resolution of developmental crises, whilst loevinger 
sees it rather as sinply one of coping- with increasingly deeper 
’problems.
As for the process of development, both Erikson and
Loevinger view the succession ftcm one stage to the next as a
dialectical process, however the resolution of the dialectic,
from the loevinger perspective, is far more well defined and
discontinuous than Erikson would perceive. Erikson describes
the process of identity formation as follcws.
From a genetic point of view, then, the process of identity formation emerges as an evolving configuration - a configuration which is gradually established by successive ego syntheses and resyntheas throughout childhood; it is a 
f configuration gradually integrating constitutional givens,, idiosyncratic libidinal needs, favoured capacities,significant identifications, effective defenses, successful, sublimations, and consistent roles."(Identity and the life cycle p.125)
From the evidence presented above, loevinger's view of ego 
development and Erikson's perspective on development do not 
gainsay each other, but rather add and enrich the understanding
of the process of development. It is thus considered useful to 
work with both of these conceptual perspectives and with their 
integration. This has already been started in the work of
Adams and Shea {1979).
There is an essential difference in the two approaches that 
has duplications for the cohort facing studied. This difference 
is based on the conflict as to whether ego development is age 
related. Losvinger makes very clear statements refuting this
possibility, and contends that even though there may be some 
covariance, the two aspects are independent of each other. 
Erikson, on the other hand, links development very clearly to 
biological aspect of the developing organism, thus age, or
rather stage specific; and interfaces this with the particular 
tasks that the family, society and the environment place before 
the developing individual at different stages of his 
development. It is this aspect of what Erikson terms
"psychosocial relativity", that seems to be the core issue, and 
it is the implication of the two approaches that are important 
to isolate. Erikson, from his perspective of different stages 
of life precipitating successive developments, implies two 
things, Firstly that successive development continues
throughout the life cycle, and secondly that young adults can in
no way have reached the concerns that older adults have, simply 
in terms of the fact that they have not been through the life 
experiences that would have precipitated them to confront and 
deal with these issues.
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Ispvinger, on the other hand, implies that there is no
particular age that one should have achieved the higher realms
of ego development, and thus it is possible that at the period
of young adulthood, a person might havss achieved the highest
stages of ego development. The question may then be asked,
after such achievement, then what does the rest of adult life
hold in the way of development? It is the view of the present
author, that there is indeed a very real difference in. the
quality of "the search for meaning" in life as different stages
of maturity are reached.
As referred to above, Erikson describes ego identity as a
sense, namely a subjective experience. Also this sense of
ego identity has certain characteristic qualities; these are,;
the awareness of the selfsameness and continuity of its
synthesizing methods; that this selfsameness and continuity,
thrombi the ego's synthesizing methods, will be observed and
preserved by others; also that, this "sense" has its
derivations, as with all the aspects of development, in the
early infant life of the individual. Erikson elaborates,
"What would we consider to be the earliest and most undifferentiated "sense of identity"? I would suggest that it arises out of the encounter of the maternal person and small infant, an encounter which is one of mutual trustworthiness and mutual recognition. ‘Ihis, in all its infantile simplicity, is the first experience of what in later reoccurances in love and admiration can only be called a sense of "hallowed presence," the need for which remains
It is this early sense of ego identity that develops and fills 
out over the years. However it is only at the time of the
:
crisis of identity vs Diffusion that the young person is invited
to confront the question of "Who am I ana what is my meaning in
this world?" At this stage there is a thrust, both to rework a
number of the crises of the earlier years, and to search for a
new sense of "continuity arti sameness" that by now includes
sexual maturity. EZikson suggests that adolescents nee5 above
all a "ircratorium" at- this point in order to be able to
integrate all the former childhood elements with the new ones.
It is the resolution of this period of integration that results
in the achievement or non-achievement of a sense of identity.
The denotation of identity as a "sense" implies the
subjective--aspect of identity. Tbs- question may then be=as)ced,
"Eo I perceive myself as having achieved an identity, or how, in
fact, do I perceive myself?" The answer to that question would
determine my personal "sense of identity." It is this subjective
aspect of identity that has failed to be noted by many
researchers in the field. However, it is not the subjective
sense alone that mist determine identity status, but that this
status, this sense of ego identity, in order to make sense, mist
also be socially acknowledged.
Erikson describes the different aspects of identity and how
to approach identifying and viewing them,
A sense of identity has a preconscious aspect which is available to awareness? it expresses itself in behaviour which is observable with the naked eye, and it hasunconscious concomitants which can be fathomed only by psychological tests and by the psychoanalytic procedure."(1968, p.105)
Finally, it is probably accurate to say that people 
experience themselves as identity achieving, transitarily, even 
though they may, on the whole and when viewed from the outside, 
be perceived as being identity achieving. Erikson says that 
identity is never "established" as an "achievement" in the form
. static, and 
i is the
result of a subtle interaction between an internal sense of self 
and feedback from the environment or outside world that verifies 
that sense. What people attempt to do in living, is create, or 
find, those experiences in the outside world that will validate 
that sense' -of -self, they - already --hold-■“(be--it positive or 
negative).
The two concepts described in the present chapter, that of 
ego identity, and that of ego development will be utilized in 
the further understanding of adult development as formulated in 
the following chapters.
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CHAPTER a
In writing about identity, Brikson (1980) refers to the "ego 
quality" of ego identity. He writes o£ "an internalized
pattern, a basic ego space" (p. 32), arti he speaks of a sense of 
a "hallowed presence" or numinousness as part of the earliest, 
most undifferentiated seise of identity, Minnicott (1971) 
writes about personalization, or the "psyche indwelling in the 
soma" representing a personal or inner psychic reality for the
These theorists are referring to the early sense of ego 
identity, that abstract quality of personal existence that 
embodies a continuous and constant inner reality.
loevinger (2,966) also makes reference to ah abstraction, an 
organic unity that is "so intimately intertwined that one can 
hardly define much less measure, separately" (Loevinger, 1966, 
p.200). She describes it as a frame of reference. Again
Erikson (1980) describes hot. the sum of identifications result 
in a "uniqUe Gestalt which is more than the sum of its parts," 
(1959, p.129.).
Brikson, Winnicott and loevinger are all referring to an 
aspect of being that is difficult to define, yet is recognized 
as being- an integral part of every individual, and the way that 
individual both acts and reacts in the world. An attempt will
be made to refire and define an understanding of this aspect in 
the. present chapter.
In this chapter a rationale will be presented for a 
hypothetical construct termed the Transitional space. This is 
follojyed . by a definition of the Transitional space, and further
a ■refinements of its structure and function and development, its 
re] ovance in therapy, and finally its importance in the present
One cannot interact with a person's inner reality as that is 
their hidden internal world. One may only interact with those 
aspects that she/he projects outwards. On a similar basis, no 
two people perceive <_ne outside world as the same. Every 
person has their own frame of reference, through which they 
filter perceptions and experience. This frame of reference is 
founded on the experiences that they have had in the world. It 
is on the basis of that experience, that a person determines a 
view of life, and it is through the idiosyncratic filter of this 
view of life that the outer world is perceived.
It is the present contention, that it is the internalized 
abstract quality tivt is inner psychic reality. Aspects of 
this inner reality are projected on to the immediate 
surroundings and constitute what Friedman and Shmukler (1986) 
have termed the Transitional Space. This represents a 
heretofore undescribed model, the understanding of which, it is 
proposed, will have important consequences for the understanding 
of b'jth individual and interpersonal psychology.
The proposition of this hypothetical construct stems from a 
postpositivistic position. Namely,
Fostpositivisai holds chat we do not have access to undubitable truths. The knowledge claims that a community accepts are those that withstand the test of practical argument and use. Knowledge is understood to be the best understanding that we have been able to produce thus far, not a statement of what is ultimately real.
Polkinghome (1983, p.3).
further, it is also suggested that the foundation and form of 
this proposed construct, termed the Transitional Space, is laid 
during the first year of life of the infant. The basis of this 
construct, that of the transitional object and the potential 
space, were originally derived by Winnicott (1963). The 
construct has, in the work of Shmukler and Friedman, (1985), 
Friedman and Shmukler, (in press) been both detailed and 
extended. It will be further extended in the present work.
Psychic space is a concept that has been addressed by the early 
and later ego psychologists: Federn (1932), Spitz (1965) and
Issakower (1938) all emphasize the importance of the boundaries 
surrounding the psyche. Federn, in particular described the 
dissolution of ego boundaries in psychosis. Despite the work 
of the ego psychologists, Grotstien (1978) asserts that psychic 
space is neglected, and worthy of psychoanalytic study in the 
development of a theory which can help to conceptualize the
Ofcr? concept of psychic space was also addressed by 
Minnicott. In his work on early child development, Winnicott 
(1971) described what he termed the transitional object, 
phencmema, and also the potential space. The concept of the 
Transitional Space extends that of the transitional 
object/phenomena and links to the concept of the potential
There is sane confusion as to the place of the concept of 
the potential space, in relation to Wiraucott's other concepts 
of boundaries and spaces. Commentators on winnicott's work,
Davis and Wallbridge (2.981) point out that it was at the time of
his death that he was working on these ideas, and that he
commented that he still was not satisfied with them. It is
proposed, here, that the concept of the Transitional Space is
that natural extension to Winnicott's work which fills the gap 
between the transitional object and the potential space.
3.2 The Transitional Space Defined
The Transitional Space is that aspect between inner and outer 
reality that is both inner and outer reality and neither. The 
transitional space falls between the me and the nct-me, between 
inner and outer reality. It is that part of the inner world
that jls projected outwards, and both reflects the internal frame 
of reference, through which the perception of the world is 
filtered, as well as those aspects of hidden inner reality that 
are perceived by others as being "me".
Inner psychic reality, on the other hand, includes beliefs 
about self, others and life? memories and fantasies? knowledge 
and thinking ability as well as fixations and introjactions. 
It coirtains what Minnicott terms the central self.
The central self could be said to be the inherited potential 
which is experiencing a continuity of being, and acquiring in 
its own way and its own speed a personal psychic reality and a 
personal body scheme.
As described above, this central self is what Erikson terms 
the sense of ego identity. It is an inner sense of the self, 
which in turn contains both the true self and the false adapted 
self. mat is projected outwards into the Transitional Space, 
is not the reality of the internal world, tilt rather how that 
person would like to be seen, contaminated by the traumas and 
unresolved issues in his/her life. So that what is projected is 
consciously filtered and unconsciously contaminated aspects of 
:rvtamal reality, which is the outwardly perceivable ego 
identity.
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It is proposed that the transitional space can be described 
in terms of boundaries, size and content. It is also proposed 
that tejinicofct's concept of the potential space will be more 
clearly understood when explained in the light of the 
Transitional Space.
The origin of the Transitional Space is best described by 
invoking the concept of the dialectic. in the very early 
relationship between mother and child, general theory on early 
development accepts that for the infant there is no inner 
reality, as there is no sense of self - no subjectivity or ego. 
Thus ttiera is also no Transitional Space, as the Transitional 
Space can only exist in the dialectic between the me and the
not-me. One "nay be able to say that the entire existence of 
the infant at that point is in the potential space of the 
mother. This may be described as an ego-lessness of being. 
Ogden (1985) in describing the mother-infant unity appreciates 
this perspective, adding to it.
"Winnicott (1960) can be taken quite literally when.he says that there is no such thing as an infant (without amother). I would add that within the mother-infant unit,neither is there any such thing as a mother. The preoccupation of the mother with fitting hetself into the place of the infant would be considered an illness if this type of loss of oneself in another were to occur in a different setting." (p. 131)
The infant exists in what, winnicoti: terms '.'unintegration1!^  ,
Davis and Wallbridge (1981) relate, that in the fragmentary
preparation for one of Wimicott's lectures, there is this
description of the unintegrated state.
...in the quiet moments let us say there is no line but just lots of things they separate out, sky seen through trees, something to do with mother's eyes all going in and out, wardering round. Some lack of need for anyintegration... .Ihat is an extremely valuable thing to beable to retain. Miss something without it. Something to do with being calm, restful relaxed and feeling one with perple and things when no excitement is around.(p. 39).
Wirmicott has also described this as a state of "going on being" 
(1956, p.303) which will later become the background of 
experience. At this time, however, it is "invisible" because 
there is nothing with which to contrast it? it is both 
background and foreground. This condition may be represented 
by the illustration below.
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Ogden notes that this undisturbed, harmoniously functioning 
mother-infant unit may only be a hypothetical entity because of 
the inevitable inperfection of the mother-infant fit. "The 
well dosed frustration that results provides the first 
opportunity for awareness of separateness" (p. 132), ard this 
imperfection of fit is what Winnicott alludes to when he 
describes the "good-enough mother," Good-enough discriminates 
from perfect. Whereas the perfect mother would perfectly 
anticipate and meet all the needs of the infant before they in 
fact become needs; thus denying the infant the opportunity of 
subjectivity and the experience of th<! me.
The imperfection of fit and the resultant frustration of the 
inf am'/needs, provides the first experience of "other" not 
meeting, his/her needs, and simultaneously of "me" not having my
needs met. "Thus the paradox where "I-ness is made possible by
the other... this constitute an interpersonal dialectic Mierein
"I-ness1* and "otherne^" create one another and are preserved by 
the other." (Ogden, 1985 p.131). cgden describes the beginnings 
and growth of this interpersonal dialectic with great facility.
The movement from rother-infant unity (invisible environmental mother) to mother and infant (iiother as object) requires the establishment of the capacity for a psychological dialectic oneness and of separateness in widch each creates ard irtfonrs the other. ftt. firet the "two-ness1 (that coexists with oneness) cannot be distributed between the mother and the .infant in a way that clearly demarcates the two as separate individuals;rather , at this point "two-ness"' is a quality of the mother-infant, This is what Winnicott (1958a) is referring to when he talks about the infant's development of the capacity to be alone in the presence of his mother. The transitional object is a syirfool for this separateness in unity, unity in separateness. The transitional object isat the same time the infant (the omnipotently created extension of himself) and not the infant (an object that he has discovered that is outside of his omnipotent control). The appearance of a relationship with atransitional object is not simply ?, milestone in the process of saparation-individuation. The relationship with thetransitional object is as significantly a reflection of the development of the capacity to maintain a psychological dialectical process.
(p. 132)
The Transitional Space will be described in relation to the 
understanding of the concepts of the transitional objects or 
phenomena and the potential space.
Inner and outer reality are aspects of experience and 
awareness that captured Winnicott's imagination, and he 
addressed them with tremendous creativity (1970). Winnicott
believed that it was inadequate to encompass human nature in 
terms of inner psychic reality and outer shared reality. He
thus deduced that there is an intermediate area to which inner 
reality and external life both contribute, and he termed it the 
"area of Illusion". He suggested that by means of this area
the inner and outer world continue to overlap. As the infant 
begins to distinguish the me fmn the not-me, there is still, 
and will continue to be, an overlap between the two, "so that
what the infant discovers in the outer world, as it becomes
not-me, he also creates" (ftavis & Wallbridge, 1981, p.58).
Grotstien (1978) describes how the development of awareness 
and toleration of the "gap", the space in distance and time 
between the going and coming of the primary object (mother), 
constitutes the "baptism" of space. "If the infant can 
"contain" this space in the absence of his object, he is able to 
initiate and expand his sense of space and is therefore able to 
be separate. Because of this he can perceive some separated 
aspects of his experience which he can then begin to represent" 
(p. 56).
Winnicott urtierstarris this process similarly but postulates 
that in order to protect himself fmn the unspeakable anxiety 
of abandonment, the baby invests an object or some phenomena 
with the contents of its world. At this point there is as yet
no clear distinction between inner and outer reality and the
world of the infant is, in s.ffect, the mother the child, and
mother-child interaction. So the transitional object is in the
paradoxical situation of being mother and not mother. It .is
baby and not-baby, and it is the mother as created by the baby,
and is also the phenomenon it is. It is in the area of
illusion where reality and fantasy meet. The transitional
object is between the me and the not-me.
"Winnicott (1970) says we are never to ask the question:Is this part of the inner world or the outer world? Rather we must accept the paradox of the transitional object, that it belongs to both and lies in the zone of illusion.(Shaiukler and Friedman, 1985, p.208)
As the child grows and develops over time this transitional object or phenomena are not forgotten, but rather lose their meaning, and this is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused, have become spread out over the entire intermediate territory between inner psychic reality and the external world as perceived by two persons in common, that is to say, over the whole cultural field.".(Davis and Wallbridge, 1981, p.60).
The diffused transitional object thus becomes the frame of
reference through which the world is experienced .and has been
termed by Shmukler and Friedman (1986), the Transitional Space.
The Transitional Space acts as a CONTEXT within which the child/person lives and interacts. The qualities of both the space itself and the boundaries of the space influence the intrapsychic and interpersonal processes' of the developing individual. The qualities of the boundaries and the space itself, are created by the baby as a function of the quality of the interaction, or lack of interaction, with the mother or caretaker and reflect the attitude of trust or mistrust as described by Brikson."(Friedman and. shmukler, in press)
Interestingly, Grotstein (1978) in passing refers to a concept
which he terms the transitional space.
Transitional space may be an ad hoc spatial allotment to permit an intermediate area between self and object for experiences such as psychoanalytic transferences to occur.
(p. 60).
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He makes no further reference to this concept; and develops his 
concepts of inner space along different dimensions.
In , understanding Erikson,s description ot the epigenetic 
stages of development by their polar opposites, and the
resolution of each crisis of development, it becomes evident 
that human development proceeds in % dialectical manner, As 
related to the definition of the dialectic by Ogden (1985), 
Intimacy, for example, only exists in tenns of isolation; and 
isolation in terms of intimacy. They both create, inform, 
preserve and negate each other. They move towards integration, 
but integration is never complete. And furthermore, each 
integration creates a new dialectical opposition and a new 
dynamic tension in the movement Hoards the next crisis of
development. /
Ihis dialectical process also occurs in the relationship 
between inner reality and the Transitional Space, where they 
both create, inform, preserve and negate eg'ch other. In similar 
fashion, potential space is related to Transitional Space, and 
potential spaces to each other. In terms of the elusive, and 
abstract quality of these aspects of being, it is more than 
appropriate that Wimicott places then in the area of
"illusion".
H-.e rudimentary structure of the space in terms of the type 
of boundaries, is laid dcwn in early childhood. The size of the 
Transitional Space grow, as one makes progress in ego
a * . : -
development, The content ot the space is the outwardly
projected; ego identity.
3.5 Transitional Space and Potential Space 
Although; the Transitional Space is an original contribution 
which h<jis not been described previously, Winnicott {1970) has 
described a concept called the potential space. In the 
following section, the potential spac$ is described, and 
differentiated from the Transitional Space.
Potential' -space is described by Winnicott as the potential, 
but never^ctual, space between the mother and.,child. It is 
always potential because it is filled with the state of mind 
that embodies the paradox that is never challenged: the infant
and mother are one; the infant and mother are two.
As Davis and Wallbridge (1981) explain.
The potential space is thus the place where meaningful communication takes place. It is the common ground in affectionate relationships where instinct tension is not a main.feature, relationships made possible by the ego-relatedness jLn infancy. Here Communication comes about through "mutuality in experience" or the overlap of potential spaces, and interpersonal relationships can "attain a richness and an ease which carries with it stability of a flexible kind which we call health".(p. 128)
Transitional Space may be said to represent the frame of 
reference - the structure from which experience perception and 
action derive. It is suggested that the Transitional Space is 
much more than the "relaxed self-realization" that is described 
by Winnicott as being the potential space. The potential space 
although termed a space, is actually described by Winnicott as a
process. It is that part of the Transitional Space that is in
contact with another, an activity, or an experience, the process
of which is clearly elucidated in the description of "Clew" as
written by Csikszentmihalyi, balcw:
The experience of enjoyment - or flow, as we have cane to fan it - is characterized above all by a deep, spontaneous involvement with the task at hand. In flow, one is carried away by interaction, to the extent that one feels immersed in the activity - the distinction between "I" and "it" becomes irrelevant. Attention is focused on whatever needs to be done, and there is not enough left over to worry or to get bored or distracted. In a state of flew, a person knows what needs to be done and knows whether the goals are being achieved or not - the feedback is clear. Yet the question of whether one is doing well or not seems to matter little; in flow a person does not worry about his or her perforrince. The sense of time becomes distorted: hours seem to pass by in minutes, but afterwards one might feel that an eternity has elapsed. The ego that surveys and evaluates our actions disappears in the flow of experience; one is freed of the confines of the social self and way fee], an exhilarating sense of transcendence, of belonging to a larger whole. (p. 321)
In summary, every individual carries with mem a projection of
their internal world. Thi? is the Transitional Space. When
alone and "experiencing" or being creative, or when in contact
with another, a person is in the potential space, that is, a
person is out of himself, and removed from the immediacy of
instinct tension.
As mentioned jbove, the Transitional Space is a context within 
which an individual lives,-it is the "basic groundplan" of the 
sense of ego identity that is referred to by Erikson, that he 
terms the relatively unconscious and unalterable infantile 
antecedents of identity.
The analogy of the growth of a nut may be used to elucidate
the process of how the sense of identity develops within the
context of the Transitional Space. The fruit develops fran the
flowers, on the tree, while the nut develops inside the fruit.
Depending on the quality of the fruit, so will be the quality of
the nut inside. Thus, ego identity develops within the
constraints of the context called the Transitional Space.
In this vein, Gregory Bateson (1978), describes how the net
of ontological and episterological premises with which a man
surrounds himself, whether ultimately true or false, become
partially self validating for him. This net of a person's
"epistemolcgy," which reflect habitual assumptions or premises
that are implicit in the relationship between him and his
environment, are described by Bateson.
"His (commonly unconscious) beliefs about what sort of world it is will determine how he sees it and acts within it, and his ways of perceiving and acting will determine his beliefs about its nature." (1978, p.285)
The concept of life scripts, originated by Berne (1978)
encompasses both the above aspects: the early derivation, and 
the directive quality of early 'decisions in setting the course 
of an individual's life. Eric Berne, (1975, p.58) quotes Adler 
as the closest of the early theorists to his own
conceptualization of life scripts. Adler writes,
”...every psychic phenomenon, if it is to give us any understanding of a person, can only be grasped and 
understood if regarded as a preparation for some goal... an attempt at a planned final compensation anti a (secret) life plan... the life plan remains in the unconscious,.."
Berne developed his own concept of life script, which he defines
as follows:
"A script is an ongoing program, developed in early childhood under parental influence, vMch directs theindividual's behaviour in the most important aspects of his life." (1975, p.418).
'te also points out that scripts belong in the realm of
transference phenomena and are derivatives,' or rather
adaptations of infantile reactions and experiences. It was
Brskine and Zalcman, (1979) who refined the idea of the
components of script, and included amongst them the
individual's beliefs about thenself, others, and the quality of
life. This reference as to how the individual assumes an
abstract context to his/her life is tvfoat Bateson refers to as
their epistemolcgical premise, or simply their epistemology?
and it is this epistemology that partially describes the concept
of the Transitional Space.
"The development of the Transitional Space has important implications for future healthy functioning since it is in this space between the me and the not-me, between inner and outer reality, that life's satisfying experiences take place. These experiences include play, intimacy,creativity and daydreaming. Here the self is free to express itself without fear of judgment or need to adapt to others^  and yet still meet "the other" in Buber's "I-Thou" sense. ' The transitional object is the baby's first act of creation and the "space" the source of creative energy. Shmukler (1985), in highlighting the centrality of this transitional area both for the developing child and for the healthy adult personality functioning, says:
No human being is ever free of the strain of relating inner and outer reality. Thus we all have a continuing need for an intermediate area that is not challenged. The potential space, originally between mother-infant, is replicated 
between children-family, individual-society andindividual-world. It is the location of culturalexperience providing consolation from the starkness of the reality principle. Thus as the young child abandons the illusion of omnipotence, his most important transitional compensation comes through play, supplemented later by every aspect of our cultural heritage.1 (Shniukler, 1985)(Shmukler and Friedman, 1985. p. 208)
As becomes clear from the descriptions above, the Transitional 
Space is neither a unitary nor a simple concept. It reflects 
both content and process, and embodies not only the potential 
and limitations for being, but also the potential and 
limitations for being with others. It thtis both defines and 
limits the context of our lives personally and interpersonally.
It is not possible for there to be interaction with an inner 
reality, so in order for interaction to take place, inner 
reality has to be projected outwards, into this Transitional 
Space? and it is in the overlapping of the Transitional Spaces 
in the potential space that communication takes place. Where 
the overlapping is minimal, due to either a permeability problem 
of the boundary, or singly because there is little depth of 
intent in the level of comunication, the encounter remains 
superficial. Mutuality occurs with the overlapping of large 
areas of Transitional Space.
As mentioned previously, it is proposed that the Transitional 
Space has three dimensions namely, boundary quality? size? and 
content.
The boundary quality of the transitional space describes the 
potential for relating to others, and trost specifically, the 
potential for contact and intimacy.
Ihe quality of the boundaries of the transitional space are 
laid in early childhood, and are a function of the quality of 
the holding environment, in particular the relationship between 
motiier and child. It is on the basis of a "goodenough" holding
environment that the potential for future relationships is
laid. If there has been good contact and the possibility for
adequate periods of unintegration in the safety of a holding 
environment, there will be an increased probability for further 
such experiences. The effects of such experiences are 
reflected in the potential of the boundaries to allow for
overlapping or fusion to take place.
The qualities of the boundaries may be described on the 
basis of two dimensions? flexibility-rigidity? and 
permeability-impermeability. Flexibility implies the ability 
to accomodate easily and well to the vagaries of demands and 
needs of other people. The permeability of the boundary on the 
other hand, determines the individual's potential for contact.
Intimacy may be described as the capacity to maintain 
periods of intense contact over a period of time.
Brikson defined intimacy as "the ability to fuse your 
identity with someone else's without fear that you are going to 
lose some of yourself" (Evans, 1969 p. 48).
The importance of Brikson'a definition here lies rather in 
the concept of fusion, and a fusion where "you are not going to 
lose some of yourself". Whitbcurne and Weinstock (1979), based 
their illustration on this conception of intimacy, in which both 
partners commit a portion of themselves to the union while still 
maintaining their identity. They illustrate the different 
intimacy statuses derived by Orlofsky, Marcia and Lesser (1973), 
by using circles to represent the individuals and the overlap 
between the circles to show how they relate to each other.
Fig. 5 : Diagram representing different intimacy statuses, 
after Whitbourne and Welnstock (1979)
To return to the present model, a flexible and permeable 
boundary implies that the individual is, in fact, flexible, is 
able to accomodate easily and well to the vagaries of demands 
and needs of other people, and is capable of true intimacy.
A flexible and iiipesmeable boundary would reflect a person 
who could accomodate living with another person, in that their 
boundaries are flexible enough to act.orodate. However a 
relationship of pseudo-intimacy would exist as his boundaries 
are impermeable.
A rigid and permeable boundary would describe a person who 
has a tendency to merger type relationships, where she/he are 
able to immerse their rigid selves in an all-ehdonpassing 
relationship that may not be described as mutual.
Boundaries that may be described as both rigid and 
inpermeable, will not encourage any relationship, and this type 
of person will tend to be an isolate.
pseudo-intimate
IMPERMEABLE
relationship
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Another a^ect to the boundaries of the transitional space 
is boundaries that are impermeable and at the same time 
fractured. Individuals who have this type of boundary
structure, alternate between being too excluding or, on the 
other hand, not having enough boundary; sc they move between 
relationships that are enmeshed, - and isolation. This may, in. 
fact, also be the movement within a relationship itself. This 
type of oscillation in relating, when operating to a 
pathological degree, has been described as the pattern of a 
"borderline" personality structure, (Erskino 1982) >
Finally, dealing with severe pathology, on the two extremes; 
where there is no boundary at all, no distinction between the me 
and the not-me, between inner and outer reality, you will find1 
psychosis. At the other extreme, where the boundary between 
the me and the not-me is too rigid, being impregnable rathen 
than impermeable and leaving no opportunity of interaction,'; 
there is the condition which has been termed autism. This 
concept of the variability of boundaries is supported in the;' 
work of Winnicott. Davis and Wallbridge (1981) note that,
"It is possible to say that: the distortion of the boundary brings about distortion in the space (and therefore in the inaturational processes). Boundary can be distorted in itself in the sense of being weak,' or fractured, or even absent when needed. Such distortion takes away fonn, so that what occurs in the space has no meaning.1 (1981, p.154)
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3.8.2 The Content of the Transitional Space:
This aspect of the Transitional Space refers to a very inclusive
definition of identity which comprises Erikson's nocion of a
sense of ego identity being a psychosocial reciprocity thus
errtoracing the intrapsychic, the interpersonal and the
environmental aspects as reflected in the development of this
sense. The inclusion of the social or environmental aspect is
also supported, by Winnicotb:
"A description of the emotional development of the individual cannot be made entirely in terms of the individual, but in certain areas, and' this (the potential space) is one of then, perhaps the main one, the behaviour . of the environment is part of the individual's own personal development and must therefore be included (1971, p. 62).
and again,
"when one speaks of a man, one must speak of him along with the summation of his cultural experiences. The Whole forms a unit" (1971, p. 116).
An added facet in the conceptualization of a sense of ego 
identity that is implied ih Erikson's approach but spelled cut 
in the work of Bateson (1378), and Erskine and Zalcman (1979) 
(see above), has to do with the belief about the quality of life 
itself. So the content of the transitional space has, in early 
infancy, the basic groundplan or epistemlcgical premise of the 
individual, which gets filled out during development with the 
details of the life plan or script as part of this inclusive 
concept of identity.
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Thus the content of the space is the outwardly perceived ego 
identity, that is , who the person seems to be.
In order to produce an exhaustive study of the Transitional
Space, all aspects of ego identity would have to be described
and assessed. This is beyond the scope of this study. It is
necessary, however to have a reasonable representation of ego 
identity. - It is on the basis of one's identity that one deals 
with all aspects and problems of living, including the 
resolution of the .."crisis of identity vs identity diffusion". 
It is this aspect of ego identity, the type of response and
resolution to the identity crisis, that will be used as a way of 
representing or ascertaining, ego identity. This is different 
fron the sense of identity. The sense of identity is part of 
the inner world and as such is inaccessible. what is 
accessible, however, is that part of the sense of identity that 
is projected out and becomes part of the Transitional Space.
V
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The size reflects the progress along the continuum of ego 
development (loevinger, 1966), so that a large size 
implies advanced development, perhaps at the autonomous or 
integrative stage, whereas a small size would reflect a limiting 
of development. The model of development that must be assumed 
here, is one that, is not primarily.linked to stage, although the 
epigenetic mode], may be incorporated.
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These three aspects together form an abstraction, the 
Transitional Space, that mediates and sets the tone, atmosphere, 
and parameters of being. This Transitional Space, that 
determines the context for being, although represented 
graphically, perpetuates the paradox, as it cannot be reflected 
in a physical dimension, but describes rather the potential, 
both in the sense of limitations and the horizons to which one 
may aspire.
The implications of the concept of the Transitional Space,
as described above, are that this context, set early in infancy,
will limit development. This is both true and not true. The
quality of the boundaries, that are determined in early
childhood, do remain "relatively unalterable,1 in Erikson's
terms? and the quality of the boundaries, as they are concerned
with the ability and ease for interaction and .intimacy, will
certainly influence development, as it is through interaction
that development takes place. However, both the size and the
content of the transitional space are still able to grow. In
fact, in the process of normal development, the size and the
content of the transitional space, are continuously developing.
Wirmicott (1980), although writing about what he terms the
potential space, notes,
"The potential, space has a capacity to expand: it's extentcan be minimal or maximal, according to the summation of actual experiences. "(Playing and Reality: the place where we live.) (p. 127)
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It is the pathological structure and definition of the 
boundaries of the Transitional Space that are laid down early in 
life, not the content or the size, and it is the aim of in-depth 
psychotherapy to effect changes in the structure, so that size 
and content may be enhanced. From this perspective it is easy 
to appreciate the worth of regressive therapy.
The following diagram illustrates the interface between the 
quality of the.boundaries and psychological health in their 
relationship with the development of a healthy or pathological 
context for living. The Y axis represents progress along the 
continuum of health, whereas, the X axis reflects the permeabilty 
of the boundaries.
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Fla 7 : Boundary Quality and Psychological Health
Two polarities at the bottom reflect pathology at the 
autistic and symbiotic levels.
other boundary problems reflect pathology at the later 
levels.
All lower levels represent problems with the 
separation/irdividuation process.
It is possible to locate the revised identity statuses on 
this graphic presentation: The curve represents the maximm
possible achievement, while the usual achievement in progress, 
along the continuum of health, is generally below the curve. 
The identity achieving individual would be placed at the apex 
(a); the foreclosed individual is placed in the normal range on 
the side of the inflexible-compulsive personality, (b); the 
negative identity is further along the inpermeability axis and 
reflecting earlier pathology and retarded development, (c) ? and 
the diffu5"=ti person is located along the curve at a position 
which reflects . boundaries that are too much on the permeable 
side combined with reasonably poor progress in ego development 
fd).
In studying role variability as an aspect of ego identity, 
Block (196i' describes its two extremes.
"At one end of this dimension, there is "role diffusion", where an individual is an interpersonal chameleon, with no Inner core of identity, fitfuL’.y reacting in all ways to all people. Ihis kind of person is highly variable in his behaviour, and is plagued by self doubts and despairs, for he has no internal reference bfaieh can affirm his continuity and self-integrity. At the other extreme, there is what might be called "role rigidity," where an individual behaves uniformly in all situations disregarding the differentresponsibilities different circumstances may iirpose. Here the core of identity is hollow, based not on a genuine and
unquestioned sense of personal integrity, but rather upon deep seated fvir of any amount of self-abandon. Somewhere in between presumably, a proper balance can be struck in the 
struggle both for identity and the capacity for intimacy."(p. 394)
With reference to the paradigm of the Transitional Space, it 
becomes c^ ear that Sleek is not only describing the "identity 
issues" involved, but rather the entire Transitional Space, 
including the boundaries, size and content. It is also 
relatively easy to place his descriptions of the personality 
types on the diagrammed curve.
As a further illustration of the model descriptions of six 
of the most obvious characterological derivatives will be 
presented below. What is important to not® is that they are 
presented here as ostensibly static and fixed types. This is 
not the reality as individuals are always in process. The 
static quality sinply reflects a cross section in time, a 
useful, if not totally accurate way to view a process, and also 
certainly not regarded as an entire view of human, complexity.
Diagram 1: represents a person where the boundaries areflexible arri permeable, thus having potential for true intimacy^  the size is large and roomy, thus dene...j.ng advanced progress along the continuum of ego development; and the content of this particular kind of ego space would tend towards identity achievement.
Diagram 2: This person had all the potential, in tents of the 
right context in early childhood, yet*, has failed to develop. There ana flexible and permeable boundaries, thus allowing for the option of true intimacy; however, because the space available for overlapping is so limited, reflecting retarded ego development, even though intimate, the relationship will be very limited in depth. This kirvd of person will probably be reasonably happy, with reasonably good relationships and a foreclosed identity.
Diagram 3: The boundaries of this person are rigid andinpenneable, yet despite this, there has been the opportunity to grew ,id develop. ' Because this growth has taken place without the kind of human Interaction that is desirable, there is the element of mutuality that is missing from this kind of person. They do see many options and are creative, but only within the bounds of their cwn framework, and there is little capacity for true intimacy. This kind of person is often autocratic, dominant and egocentric, and can be found among many successful business people who call themselves "workaholics". The# would have a tendency toward identity achievement.
Diagram 4: This £ype of individual has rigid and impermeableboundaries, without? the potential for true intimacy; the size of the Transitional1" Space is small, reflecting major trauma and fixation at early stages of development that have resulted in a retardation of the process of ego development. This illustration would • represent what has been termed the narcissistic personality,, and would probably tend to a negative or pethaps achieved identity,
\/\
\ /Diagram 5: This configuration has boundaries that alternatebetween beim rljid and impermeable, and not having boundaries at all. The illustration therefore depicts fracturedboundaries. -This type of person oscillates between "wonderful" expansive enmeshing intimacies, and isolation. They may have progressed fairly well along the continuum of ego development, however, there is a quality of instability about their life. One could probably place this person in the identity status of diffusion, but there is , strong tendency to often be in moratorium from one status ;to another. This person may be very creative, but there is a sense of brittleness or explosiveness about them.
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Diagram 62 Finally, this diagram also illustrates fractured, boundaries, with the inability for real intimacy. This person; like the one represented in diagram 4, has had very early traumfe and fixations, resulting in a limited size of transitional space, and thus little progress in terms of ego development. This type of person would tend to have a diffused/confused sense of ego identity, and portrays the borderline personality, with typical alternation between needing closeness and needing distance.
Transitional
Below is a table Illustrating the boundary quality and size 
of individuals, as well as the tendency to which those aspects 
would shape the ddreotion of identity resolution.
achieving achieving diffuse
foreclosed negative identity diffuse
&
To return to the conceptualization of ego s 
earlier, it is considered useful to integrate that portrayal of 
ego identity, representing the content of the Transitional 
Space, with the diagrams reflecting the size and boundary 
quality.
f 4
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4,' .CRISIS
NO OMmMEMT
The fourth dimension of the transitional space that will sinply 
be described, but not elucidated, is the extension of that 
being, neither of inner or outer reality, a quality that can 
only be described in transpersonal terms, a religious quality. 
It is both of the self, the other, and the space. Ertitson, in 
his description of the poem in Dr. Borg's life cycle, says,
"The poem, the setting, the tone, seem to confirm the sense in which, every friuman being's Integrity may be said to be religious (whether explicitly or not), namely in an inner search for and a wish to communicate with, that mysterious,
that Ultimate other: for- there can be no I without 'other'. That, in fact, is the first revelation of the life cycle, when the maternal person's eyes shit tngly recognise us even as we begin to recognise har." (1978 p. 12)
In other places, Eriksun refers to a sense of hallowed 
presence or numinousness, reflecting the original experience 
between infant and mother of mutual trustworthiness and mutual 
recognition.
Winnicott refers to the evolution of religious groupings as 
a degree of overlapping of personal potential spaces.
However, it is the view of the present author that true 
religious experiences must be the ultimate in experience of the 
potential space,, as described by Dr. Borg, above.
A final aspect of the transitional space with which it is
important to deal, is that of the transitional space and
psychotherapy. This has been dealt with in greater detail
previously, (shmukler and Friedman, 1985; Friedman and Shmukler,
in press). In brief:
The transitional area is significant not only for healthy development, but also for psychotherapy since "psychotherapy is done in the overlap of the two play areas, that of the patient and that of the therapist" (Winnicott, 1970, p. 63). When the patient has not developed this wace, it is necessary to create the play space or tra... Itional area before therapy can # occur because it is here that true communication is possible. Implicit then to the task of therapy is the use or the creation of the space.(p. 209).
Winnicott believed! that the difficulty in therapy arises
11"
when "the play area has been lost, or has never developed." 
(Davis and Wallbridge, 1981, p. 170) and so he tackled that 
problem,
"in the setting provided by his personal reliability, which seme' ■"'s meant doing nothing more than being alive and atten r * (silent communicating), a point could be reached wiiere a potential space could begin to be."(Davis and Wallbridge, 1981, p. 171).
• Ihe the' v-'tfcic process is an attempt to change the basic' 
structure ot how inner reality is projected into the :
transitional space, Inner reality itself, cannot change, as it 
is a record of the history of the individual. % ."fiful way to 
view human functioning is through Berne's notion of ego states 
(Berne, 1962). As a- part of the inner psychic reality, the 
Parent Ego state (Berne, 1981) contains all the material that is 
introjected from tM parents, parental figures and culture. 
This winnicott refers to as the "inherited potential," which, he 
maintains gives inner reality its organization and its 
structure. Another , part of inner reality, the Child ego state 
is made up of a series of fixated points in development as they
occurred to the developing child. Both of these ego states are
accurate representations of the history of experience.
"Selective perception” takes place with the ego's 
integration of these two aspects or ego states, in the search 
for meaning. Things are recalled and aspects perceived in a 
way that will fit into the epistemology of the individual. The 
function of the Mult ego state is to project inner reality into
the Transitional Space and so interact with the environment in
terms of the here and now. The Adult ego state is limited in 
this function by the contamination of its space by the other ego
'At'#*,
of all
states. Thus the projection, into the Transitional Space will 
not reflect the actual history of the individi’al, b^ ’.t rather the 
history of that individual that is reflected within the context
of his epistanalogy. it is through, ar& within this
projection, that living and intp^ actionVitakes -place.
psychotherapy it is possible to access 
mat i-ad been, repressed, thus affirming the 
of imer. reaiity. The process of in
ckyth . rBgr»seiye itherapy attempts to reach the
ibt| verbal or preverbal 
life..'Through the re-experiencing 
outcome's, the aim is to change 
_the. .persons context foi living,
the Transi^ icyiai' E
v-*\ ;3.10 The; Transitiona?. SUacety)d.the Sfcsent Study 
It is within tl* /Context of .these, .tiiree. aspects of the
Transitional s^ iabaj naneiy; t^ e si^: as reflected, in ego 
develcpnent, thi-i content as./repiresenteti- in an inclusive view of 
a senqe'of identity; and the qualitv of the boundary vrtiich
: rcrleistn capaCjity for closeness <^ i 'ijikjlmacy, that a person
Will,, dhoose a partner in life. ’ihSs-i aspects of the two 
' ;»itners Will define the parameters of theix Carriage.
It is hypothesized that the interpli!/ between personal 
VK-iracteristics and the type of intimay,' stotus tiiet results 
will .influence both the context within which the baby is bom, 
ahd also the impact this birth will have on the partners and
their marriage. The baby itself, together with its own genetic 
predisposition, episterology and thus developing Transition^ 
Space, will most certainly play its role in the effect on both 
the partners, and their marital relationship.
The concept of the Transitional Space is a,por.vribution to
sense that it allows one to separate the >W£mal hidden world,. 
the world that can only be reported on, t'raiL-Gst which is 
perceived by others. 1
The understanding of the Transitional Space illustrates the 
concepts of contact, boundaries and boundary disturbances in a 
graphic manner and allcws extrapolation in terms of interaction 
and interactional patterns. It graphically illustrates the' '
basis and development of an individual's frame of reference, and 
hew these frames of reference are interpolated between 
individuals.
The concept of the Transitional Space elucidates how
relationships work, and why certain relationships don't work.
Finally, the concept of the Transitional Space allows one to 
place Winnicott's concept of the potential space, understand the 
blurring of boundaries, not only between people, but also 
between a person and an involving activity. It explains the
concept of flow, and links it to to that of contact in an
original way.
Terms often used to describe the underpinnings of good -.harital 
relaticaiships are love, and .intimacy. In this chapter the 
concept of love will be explored arid related to the basic 
ccnsspt of contact-origiB'jted tey Peris (1978). The conceit of 
contact will be used to describe an aspect 01 the previously 
postulated hypothetical construct, ..the. Transitional Spaas, and 
the understanding derived therefrom will be used to explain 
intimacy and hew it functions in the marriage.
y
Love is an aspect of being that tegs reflection, as it is on the 
basis of love that long term commitments are most often made, 
love is that elusive condition that so many yearn for, that is 
edified by poetry and song, and is so highly valued that people 
are even prepared to die for it. It is so often clearly and 
romantically expressed the beginning of a relationship, 
highlighted at the start of a f fi st pregnancy, and mourned with 
sadness whenever ended.
The first issue to be addressed is to define or describe 
this elusive thing called love. As stated by rope (1980. p. 
ix), "such fundamental huiran activities as falling in love
scientific research and clinical practice." A significant
area for attention, when studying couples and their
relationships during- the transition to parenthood, is the
development and change of the love relationship between the
couple and between them and their new infant. This is of
primary concern at this. time.
Pope proposes a working definition of love:
A preoccupation with another parson. A deeply felt desire to be with the loved one. A feeling of Incompleteness without him or her. Thinking of the loved one often,whether together or apart. Separation frequently provokes feelings of genuine despa:Lr or else tantalizing anticipation of reuniting. Reunion is seen as bringing feelings of euphoric ecstasy or peace and fulfillment," (1980, p.4)
Both the theoreticians and the researchers have all provided 
descriptions of love. On reviewing the major recent work it 
appears that although all describe love using different
terminology, they all, in effect, have reduced love to three 
major components which may be related to the major components 
described by Stembera (1986).
Sternberg, in his triangular theory of love, describes 
these three components as: (a) intimacy, which refers to
feelings of closeness, connectedness, and bondedness; (b)
passion, which refers to the drives that lead to romance, 
physical attraction, sexual consummation and related phenomena; 
(c) decision/cmmitment, which refers to the short term
decision, and long term commitment to the lova relationship.
Rubin (2970), as illustrated in the "Love Scale" describes: 
(a) an affillative and dependency need, which may be related to 
"intimacy" (b) an orientation of exclusiveness and absorption, 
which may be related to "passion", (c) a predisposition to 
help, which may Wre&ctsS co commitment.
Weiner (1980) contends that an intimate relationship 
requires (a) ccaramanication, (b) mature romantic love,
(c) commitment. CsjJczsehtMhalyi (1980) differentially defines: 
(a) love in the broader sense when a person invests 
attention in another person with the intention of realizing that 
person's goals (b> Romantic love when a person cannot control
his or her attention being invested in another person, yet
enjoys the experience.
He sees the criterion of love as striving to realize the 
other's goals, while the criterion of ranantic love is seen as 
spontaneity and enjoyment. When all three conditions are 
satisfied at the same fc.tee, love and ranantic love are both 
present, merged in the same act of attention.
Again, this description is not divergent from tbs one 
offered by Sternberg (1986). What becomes clear from the this 
tripartite division, is that it is possible to have any
combination of the three components of love, but that none, 
other than the three in combination, will result in what 
Sternberg (1986) calls consummate or complete love. For
exairple, passion, on its own may be called infatuation, which 
suffers from aJJ the problems of a relationship that has neither 
intimacy nor commitment. Intimacy, without passion and with 
commitment, may be viewed as what has been termed "companionate
love"(Walster and Walster, 1978).
The conclusion that may be drawn from the literature and 
ftom comron understanding, is that while the term "love" ray be 
used by many people and researchers in a description of a 
relationship, it will mean different things to different people, 
and so, unless clearly defined, it may be confusing rattier than 
clarifying. What is relevant from the perspective of the 
Transitional space construct1; is - that of the three major 
components of love described by Sternberg (1986), two, those of 
intimacy ard decisiory'cofnmitment are included in the description 
of the Transitional Space. What is also of significance in all 
the above descriptions, is that the aspect of commitment appears 
to be one of. the comerstir^s of a loving relationship. It is 
this aspect of commitment, that recurs, both in the theory and 
research on identity as well as in that of love. Thus the basic 
capacity for loving is contained within the Transitional Space
4.2 Aspects of love
It would appear, therefore, that me of the basic features of 
ego development that underpins the ability to be identity 
. achieving, is the capacity to tomtit oneself to a cause, 
activity or career. It is this capacity for positive 
commitment that again appears as the cornerstone of loving 
relationships. It thus becomes obvious, from a theoretical 
standpoint, as to why the relative achievement of identity is 
hacessary in order to achieve a mature loving relationship.
Inrnature love, the love described *,by Erikson (1969), as the 
search for identity as reflected in the other, most often ends 
with disastrous consequences. V
Geller and Howelistien (1980),, confirm the inadequacy of 
immature love, and state that "paradoxically, fulfillment of any 
ronantic strivings, including "infantile" wishes, is possible 
only when an individua], has grown up" (p. 84). The finding of 
levinson and othere, (1978). indicate that yeung men are novice 
lovers, husbands and fithes^  They are, in general, not
capable of highly lc*3 . free, and emotionally
intimate relationships, bi^ s* .Vguiding energy during early 
adulthood tends to be narcissistic.
Weiner (128CH , in d l'scussirig 1-^ althy anl pathological love 
says that:
A prerequisite to adult ronantic love is the dev&lopmunt of a certain level ' of intrapsychic and interpersonal maturation. In the psychoanalytic view, adult love requires successful completion of the oral, anal, and oedipal stages of psyteo-sexual development. That ..is, one distinguishes one's sel,£ and tone's dwn needs from others', 
develops a sense of autonomy and . self-direction, and sufficiently disentangles fran the s&cualized attachment to parents 'to love & person for himself or herself end nob because of his or her'Similarity to, or dissimilarity fran, a parent.
(p. 13.4)
However, love is not enough to sustain an intimate relationship. 
Weiner (1980) states that "Love provides the bond between 
people, but their personal attributes provide the structure of 
the relationship" (p. 126-p.7).
IWalster and Walster (1978) use "equity theory" to explain 
why people seem to get what they feel they deserve from life and 
from a marital partner. Sager (1976), postulates that married 
couples make inplicit and explicit contracts with each other; 
and KLhaek, (1979) views love to be motivated "in part by the 
fact that the partner meets unconscious heeds and in part by 
finding a replacement for the first lost luve" (p. 60}.
Finally Erskine (1982), proposes, in his model of interlocking 
racket systems, that
"the script in each family member is intricately woven into a family pattern. Each person influences and is influenced by the behaviour of others in the family, who provide reinforcing experiences that confirm the script beliefs" (p. 254).
Clearly, then, in the same way, each of the partners will
provide reinforcing experiences that confirm the script beliefs
of the other.
In effect, the implications of all the above research and 
theory, is that for romance to develop t nto a long term 
relationship involving some degree of intimacy and commitment, 
there has to be, in addition to the attraction of passion, some 
interlocking in meeting the unconscious needs of each other.
Classically then, love would represent a transference 
relationship, at least in part, with the repetition compulsion 
occurring frequently, as each partner attempts to have their 
unconscious needs met (Weiner, 1980, KLimek, 1979).
"ihe adult needs for kissing, smiling, and physical caring
QO
or love-making' have their origins in the shared gaze, touch, holding and vocal conversations of infant and 
mother. (Scharff, 1932, p.24) 
It is necessary, however,to distinguish between well 
functioning and pathological relationships, because although 
each will have aspects of the other, it is in the degree to 
which certain aspects pertain in the marriage that makes it 
viable or not. It is only in pathological, or ill-functioning 
systems, that such aspects actually dominate the relationship. 
Weiner (1980) describes the common elements in pathological love 
relationships that differentiate them from healthy love 
relationships. They are static and repetitive, and they are 
closed systems that do not allow new information to enter. He 
observes that the repetition compulsion occurs in many love 
relationships and that the mature person's ties to his or her 
parents form only a partial framework for adult love 
relationships, while for the immature person, they form rigid 
confines.
Both an explanation and expansion of the above perspective
is found in the writings of Seller and Howenstein (1980).
They refer to icewald's reasoning (1978),
based upon Kierkegaard's notion of the "dialectic of repetition," is that repetitions of transference paradigms Airing adulthood contain aspects of novelty as wall as an . active and imaginative reorganisation and elaboration of early love relations, and that consequently our love relations do not remain determined Ijy the unmodified power of infantile prototypes.
(P. 70)
It. is the creative elaboration of early love relationships 
that allows foe the mutative, growing and developing 
relationship, as described by Goethals (1980;.
Csikzsentmihalyi (1980) embraces this perspective in his 
criticism of closed vie»j of behaviour and his proposal of the 
acceptance of an open view of behaviour. Ha describes a 
closed view as perceiving that needs motivations and rewards are 
set by genes aria , prior, experience. From this viewpoint, 
whatever the organism encounters later in life will have no 
chance to modify the already established structure of needs and 
reward contingencies, Every new experience derives its meaning 
only frcm Its relation to a set pattern of motivations. An 
open view of JjeiiavieuE, on the other hand, assumes that 
individuals
learn new "needs," motivations, and rewards in the course of their development, and that these emerging motivational systems must be understood in their own right, rather than be explained away solely in terms of past conditions of the organism. (Csitesentmihalyi, 1980. p. 309)
He defines emergent motivation as a process whereby previously 
neutral stimuli became reinforcing because they produce new 
experience.
Even though the distinction between the two systems is a 
valid and useful, one, understanding systems function is mare 
complex than the simple acceptance of one model over another. 
In fact, it would appear that both aspects, that of closed
static systems arxi emergeiit motivati "lal systems need be 
appreciated in the study of love arti .loving relationships. It 
is the static, closed repetitive systems that are pathological 
and end up with marital problems, while it is the emergent 
motivational open system that describes the healthy successful 
relationship.
There is increasing evidence that relationships fern the basis
of ,'our mental and physical well-being (Duck, 1986) ? they are
certainly the building blocks of marital and family life.
Contact may be viewed as the unit out of which relationships are
built. In the following section, ths concept of contact will
b% presented within its historical context, and linked to the
hypothetical construct of the Transitional Space
Fritz Peris, originally a psychoanalyst, whose contribution
to psychology is Gestalt Therapy, not only descrj-bed ar&
emphasized the importance of contact bsfcWeen an individual anti
the environment, but he based a. largfii part of his work on
contact, interruptions to contact, and the contact boundary.
Peris,(1973) wrote:
On the psychological l«vel, man needs contact with other human beings as much as,; on the physiological level, he needs food and drink. Man's sense of relatedness to the group is as natural to him as his sense of relatedness to any one oS his physiological survival impulses Indeed, this sense of identification is probably his primary psychological survival impulse.
(p. 24)
Eric Berne, the originator of Transactional Analysis, writing
at the same time as Paris also recognized the value of contact
between people, and described it as a basic need, or "hunger":
The intolerance for long periods of boredom or isolation gives rise to the concept of "stimulus-hunger", particularly for the kind of stimuli offered by physical intimacy. This stimulus-hunger parallels in many ways, biologically, psychologically, and socially, the hunger for focd."(Berne, 1981. p. 77)
Berne based his ideas afccui: the need for recognition on the work 
of spitz (1945), who fourti that infants who were emotionally 
deprived, in terms of inadequate social handling and physical 
intimacy, displayed organic deterioration as well as psychic 
changes. Berne thus developed his concept of "strokes" and
stroking. He viewed strokes as a unit of recognition, and the
basic underlying motive for most fotins of interaction.
Both Berne and Peris were among the first theorists to take 
psychotherapy out if the exclusive domain of the intrapsychic, 
into the inclusive, holistic perspective of man in interaction 
with his environment. Interaction with the environment .Implies 
contact, and thus contact with the environment and with other 
individuals become the natural development from intrapsychic, to 
interactional interest.
Peris sees the contact boundary as the point of balance 
between man and society. "His difficulties spring not from the 
desire to reject such equilibrium, but from the misguided 
movements aimed towards maintaining it" (1973, p. 24).
Essentially the concept of contact and contact boundaries, is 
about the individual in an environment, and the
,;A
interaction of each with each other.
In order to acquire positively cathected objects, the 
individual contacts his environment, he reaches out towards it, 
and withdraws ftm those objects or people that have negative 
cathexis.
., .Contact itself is neither good not' bad......Hence, notevery contact is healthy and not every withdrawal unhealthy. One of the cfiai-qgteeristics of the neurotic is that he can neither make good contact nor can he organize his withdrawal.(Peris, 1973. p.20)
Further elucidation is offered by Peris, Hefferline and Goodman
(1976): l|
When we say "boundary" we think of fcoondary between; but the contact fcoundazly, t^ ere experience occurs, does not separate the organism and its environment, rather it 1 units the organism, contains and protects it, and at the same time ittouches the environment It is essentially the organ of aparticular relation of the organism ai=d the environment."(p. 275)
The experience of the contact boundary reflects how the 
individual interacts with the field, which is "an exciting, 
choice making experience" in which .customary things are out,
and artful decisions become a necessity" (Folster and Polster, 
1973, p.103).
The Gestalt approach views contact and withdrawal as
dialectical opposites, and as descriptions of the way 
.individuals meet psychological events. They describe how 
individuals deal with objects in the field, at the contact
boundary.
As stated above, neither contact nor withdrawal, as such, are 
seen as healthy or unhealthy, it is rather an appropriate
balance of tuns spent in either, that manifests psychological 
health. ,
Peris describes how all neurotic disturbances arise from an
inability on the part of the individual to find and maintain a
proper balance between himself find the environment; and how
this imbalance is experienced as the ehvricsrr^ itil-'tourdary
extending too far over into the. individual.
His NEUROSIS is a defensive iw&ioeuvre to protect himself against the threat of being crowded out by an overwhelming world; It is his most effective technique for maintaining his balance and his sense of self regulation in a situation where he feels the odds are all against him."(Peris, 1973. p. 31)
The four boundary disturbances described by Paris, are 
introjection, confluence, projection and retroflection. An 
understanding of these boundary disturbances is facilitated with 
reference to the concept of the, r Transitional Space and the 
boundaries thereof. In the disturbances of introjection and 
confluence, boundaries disappear, and the person no longer has a 
sense of the me and the not-me. In the disturbances of 
projection and retroflection, rigid impermeable boundaries are 
erected, interaction is essential:with self, and there is no 
possibility of real contact with the other. So, in describing 
contact and withdrawal as dialectical opposites, Peris kept than 
within the "normal" range. However, if you extend both states 
to their extremes, the polarities are, confluence on the one 
hand, and isolation on the other, representing the boundary
disturbances.
A descriptions! analysis of the boundary disturbances with 
respect to the construct of the Transitional Space may be found 
in Appendix A.
When looking at the the qualities of the transitional space, 
the content and size, as reflecting a developmental progression, 
are: apt to diange fairly slcwly. Hmrevtar, the boundary quality, 
even thou^ i generally reflecting a certain form, may change many 
times in one day, and even many times within an interaction with 
one person.
For example, a person ray. approach an interaction with 
another, wondering what that person thinks of him, using 
projection to fill in the gaps created by his anxiety. As the 
interaction progresses, and is going well, be begins to take 
down his defenses, make good contact, and even possibly during 
an intensely emotional mutual experience, have moments of 
confluence. At sane point, the other may begin to withdraw or 
do or say something hurtful, at which point the person again 
feels threatened, erects a strong boundary between them, bites 
down on his teeth to ston his c*m vicicus response, and is at 
that point retroflecting.
Paris (2.973) described the optimal conditions of 
psychological health, in terms of the individual contacting his 
environment. Contact with another individual also may be 
subsumed under the same description:
If contact is overprolonged, it becomes ineffective orpainful; if withdrawal is overprolonged, it interferes withthe processes of life. Contact and withdrawal, in a rhythmic
pattern, are our means of satisfying our needs, of continuing the processes of life itself. (Eteris, 1973. p.23)
In similar vein, Eric Berne described intimacy as what can
happen between people that is beyond games:
Bilateral intimacy is defined as a candid, game-free relationship, with mutual free giving and receiving and without exploitation.(1978,.p.25)
4.5 Contact and the Transitional Space
The concept of the Transitional Space enhances the 
understanding of contact and withdrawal and their function in 
intimate relationships. An intimate relationship is
conceptualized by Whitboume and We instock (1979) as two 
individuals, represented by two circles. farts of the areas of 
the circles overlap in an intimate relationship, as illustrated 
in the figure below.
"llustration of an
Weinstock. 1979).
The rhythmic pattern of contact withdrawal, as described by 
Peris (1978) would be represented by energy being cathected and 
withdrawn fran the overlapping areas. When the energy is 
cathected, there is an overlapping of that r -.pect of the 
Transitional Space that has been termed the potential space, and
Intimacy is experienced. However, when energy is retracted, 
and the parties withdraw, the potential space is still there, 
making the return to intimacy that much easier in the future.
Each person has their own particular Transitional Space with 
its specific configuration of boundary size, quality and 
shape. When two pecple come together and form a relationship, 
their relationship will be a function of the characteristics of 
these two Transitional Spaces, as well as more than the sum of 
then. This relationship will consist of the special way that 
these two transitional spaces overlap, or fail to overlap, thus 
forming a unique area of relationship. .
Interestingly, long before Peris and Berne, the concept of 
overlapping personal spaces and unique forms or areas of 
relationship was previously described by Lewin (1935), although 
largely disregarded.. In his conception of the interpersonal 
field, lewin wrote hew human beings create in a dyad an 
interpersonal field: "A" interacting with "B" is not siitply "A" 
plus it is "A" interacting with "B" to create a third field
"C". A man and a woman represent differentiated individuals as 
"A” and "B," as well as being in the: dyadic field of "C".
In another, and rather appealing reference to this unique 
configuration of a relationship, Zephyr (1982) has even given it 
a name. She describes hew, when a relationship is formed 
between two people they create between them, what she calls a 
"spiritual child", namely, the particular configuration of the 
coming together of those two people. It is this "spiritual 
child" that is the function of the characteristics of their
Transitional Spaces as well as more than the sum of them. This 
spiritual child only exists for the two of them in each other's
presence. However they each carry with them the potential
space to house that particular relationship. It is as though
the relationship has a special size, shape and form which
imprints itself into the Transitional Space of the two 
individuals, and each time they come together, they can slip 
Into the potential spaces already created and not need to create 
that space anew; thus the experience of friendship or intimacy, 
where people can simply pick up where they left off even af*:er 
long periods of separation. The understanding of this model has 
two important implications.
The first one has to do with the importance of the primary 
familial relationships. It may be that those relationships had 
a particular form that the individual tries to match with other 
intimate relationships to fit into the familiar potential space. 
If that person's own system of functioning is a closed and 
static one s/he will continuously try and fit the same or 
successive people rigidly into the same mold, like trying to fit 
the proverbial square peg into a round hole, with the dire 
consequences to which it will lead.
Secondly, major changes in one or the other of the partners, 
producing changes in the shape size or boundary characteristics 
of their Transitional Spaces may change the context of the 
potential space and so that even though the potential space, or 
the spiritual child of a particular relationship still may exist 
in its original form, the new characteristics of the
Transitional Space of one or both of the partners may change the 
future potential of the relationship.
4.6 Intimacy
m  an interesting introduction to the discussion of Intimacy 
vs Isolation, Erikson (1973) remarks that the particular
strength acquired in th#a resolution of the previous crisis/ is 
"tested by the necessity „o to transcend it Li such a way tihat 
the individual can take chances in the next stag'- with what w%s 
most vulnerably precicus in the previous one" (19VP, p. 237).
Ironi,cally then, it is when an individual has- Successfully 
resolved the crisis of identity vs Identity diffusion, and 
attained a measure of a sense of identity, that'this sense, of 
identity will need to be transcended and jeopardised as intimacy 
implies the ability to fuse one's identity with that: of another, 
without the fear tliat one would lose one's own. (Peris et al. 
1976). What is meant by the fusion of identities? Erikson ,
defines intimacy as "the capacity to commit himself to concrete 
affiliations and partnerships and to develop . the ethical 
strength to abide by such commitment's, even though they may call
For a proper understanding c& the concept of intimacy, an
examination of the relevant terms in the above definition will 
clarify what intimacy is and is not. The term to commit, is 
defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as to "pledge oneself 
by implication, bind oneselfV Ihis implies a carefully
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considered entrupflng of oneself to another? a giving over of 
one's self to another in the belief that the other will respect 
and care for that self.
A partnership implies that this commitment of self to another 
is a mutual one, in whjtii both partners have equal rights and 
shares. Brikson (1978) then states that one must?,''then develop 
the ethical .'strength to abide by such commitments. This 
underlies the attainment of a significant level of moral
development; at the same time Erikson does not expect this 
ethical strength necessarily to exist at the time of commitment, 
but that it does need to develop to sustain the commitment. In 
order to sustain a commitment, significant sacrifices and 
ccsnptomises have to be made. Thus intimacy is not viewed with
the romantic lense with which it often begins, but rather as a 
long term catmitment of oneself to another and the accepting of 
the other's commitment to oneself, together with the joys and 
the difficulties that this type of relationship implies.
Intimacy is described by Erikson (1978) as being more than 
genitality as expressed in orgastic potency, as rather 
heterosexual mutuality. Ihus sexual intimacy is only part of 
true intimacy, and sexual intimacy is often present before the 
development of a true and mutual psychological intimacy between 
people. Marriage, also does not necessarily imply either the 
attainment of identity or true intimacy. Many people marry in
the search for their own identity as ~+-.cd in the other, 
most often with disastrous consequent
In his description of the Utopia ■: . Vitality, Brikson
B
includes:
1. mutuality of otgasm »2. with a loved partner
3. ot the other sex4. with whom one is willing and able to share mutual trust5. and with whan one is able and willing to regulate the cycles
a. work 1 "b. procreationc. recreation ...6. so as to secure to the offspring, too, all the stages of a satisfactory development. (1978, p. 239)
As implied in the above description, intimacy naturally 
should evolve into the concern for the next generation. And so 
the next stage of development that of .Generativity vs Stagnation 
is faced. Generativity is seen as the interest in establishing 
and guiding the next generation, the major aim of parenting. 
Thus the ftuits of intimacy result in the push to generativity. 
Again Erikson warns that the fact of having or even wanting to 
have children does not imply generativity. In fact it is the 
severe problems that are faced by many parents that often attest 
to the failure to have achieved the developmental stage of 
generativity.
The implications of Erikson* s -work have found widespread 
interest and application. Mary researchars have carried out 
work to validate and extend the concepts.
Yufit (1956) found that the individual who may be described 
as having the potential for intimacy, was characterised by 
stability, sociability, and warmth. The isolate on, the other 
hand, was self-centered, self-doubting, mistrustful, and "at 
best his relationships with others are formal and stereotyped,
lacking in warmth and spontaneity" (Yufit, 1956, p. 69).
Orlofsky, Marcia and lesser (1973) derived five intimacy 
statuses, reflecting five variations in the- resolution of the 
intimacy-isQlatlon crisis. This was an expansion of the 
dialectic proposed by Erikson to represent the resolution of 
this crisis. This expansion presumed that rathej^ than simply 
two possibilities, there is a broad range of -possible outcomes 
of the crisis. These outcomes are described as the intimate, 
preintim^e, pseudointimate, stereotyped relationship,, and 
isolate statuses. Kacerguis and Adams (1960). confirmed and 
extended the findings of Marcia (1966) and Orlofsky et al 
(1973). They found that more a-V' \ges of identity
development were associated with higri=* - levsis of Intimacy 
formation, not only for males, but for females as well.
Orlofsky, (1976) measured and validated-his described modes 
of reacting to the intimacy-isolation crisis of young adulthood. 
An interesJ v, finding in tiiis study, was that "Commitment is 
the aspect .£ intimacy which is most specific to the stage of 
young adulthood described by Erikson" (p. 96) ‘'Corrnd.tment'' in 
the previous sentence, may more realistically be stated as, the 
capacity for commitment to a cause - li$nce one may understand 
the rationale for the relationship bet,<**1 intimacy and identity 
resolution, as commitment is also >r<: of the axes on which 
identity resolution is determined. ..
The experience of deep intimacy is generally accepted as
involving a blurring of boundaries and <ve losing of a sense of
separateness from the other. (Hreud 1961; Fancher 1973;
Horner 1978? Frcmn 1956), '-vz
"But toward toward the oatside at any rate, the ego seems to maintain clear art sharp lines of demarcation. There is only one state - admittedly an unusual state, but not one that can be stigmatized as pathological - in which it does not do this. At the height of being in love, the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away"Fraud (1961, £>. 13)
This is seen as both the positive experience of losing cne's 
self, or merging, and the negative, of total vulnerability to 
the loved one (Fromm 1956? Fancher, 1973). This experience of 
the loss of boundaries is reflective of the earliest levels of 
psychosexual development where there is no differentiation 
between self and other (Weiner 1978; Erikson 1973). This is 
described by Benedek (1959); Mahler et al (1975) and others as a 
normative symbiotic phase. It must be noted that the 
experience of the loss of boundaries is not continuous, but 
rather moments of confluence as described by Peris.
In order to experience this deep sense of intimacy in the 
losing of one's boundaries and one's identity, it is presently 
concluded , that the individual must be wel?, differentiated, and 
has to have progressed well along, the continuum of ego 
development, and has achieved seme sens? of ego identity. This 
is necessary in order to be able :to give that over in the 
loving of another, and so the two orientations of 
individuation-merger are seen as functionally inseparable
; >
(Leveison and Harris 1980? Frdmm 1956, May 1969). Thus there 
is the ability of the healthy Well differentiated adult to have
a deep and fulfilling love relationship, while an inmatwre
relationship will be priaarily narcissistic. h pathological 
relations'tip will be an endless r^etition of the attempt to get 
the fixated needs met, while holding on to a poorly defined 
sense of self; or alternatively of desperately trying to regain 
the symbiosis that was felt as safe, but never evolved beyond, 
in early childhood.
Another allusion to the blurring of boundaries is made by 
Csikzsentmihnlyi (1980), as he describes the experience of 
enjoyment or flew.
Losing the confines of the social self may be related to
Winnicott's concept of the immersion in the activity and of the
potential space.
For the individual, then, the potential space is the area of all satisfying experience through which he or she can reachinto "intense sensations" which "belong to the early years"and thus to awareness of being alive.(Davis and Wallbridge 1981, p. 64)
Thus the concept of the Transitional and potential space arri 
the blurring of boundaries permits a clear illustration of the 
pEccesses of involvement and intimacy.
In the discussion of intimacy, love and the loss of 
boundaries, clarity is lost by inadequately defined terms. 
Intimacy is sometimes defined as the experience of closeness, 
and the loss or blurring of boundaries? in other words the 
experience of contact (Peris 1973}. At other times,
particularly in the work of Erikson, intimacy is defined as all
V*#*'
of the above, plus the aspect of consnitraent (1978, p.238).
Confusing these two definitions result in confusion in 
conceptualizations and implications. It necessary, then to 
refine the definitions. The former definition of intimacy will 
be t-ermed contact. The latter definition, the one inclusive of 
caimitment, is termed Intimacy. On this basis, Erikson's 
proposition beccmes acceptable that there cannot be intimacy 
without having achieved a reasonable sense of identity. On the 
other hand, the capacity to have many contactful experiences, 
without- having a well differentiated identity, and: without being 
able to make the true commitment that true intimacy requires, or 
to stay through the process of contact withdrawal, is equally 
tenable. In terms of the paradigm of the resolution to the 
crisis of intimacy vs isolation the three outcomes of Identity
achievement, foreclosure and negative identity all have in 
common the internal perception of an identity. This exists 
regardless of the process by which it is achieved or the social 
acceptability of this identity. It may be concluded, 
therefore, that in terms of the capacity for intimacy, persons 
in those three categories will be able to achieve some level of 
intimacy; whereas it is the diffuse individuals and those in
moratorium that do not have the capacity to risk the identity
they do not possess.
Now, in relation to the Transitional Space, it hvccanes 
necessary to redefine the concept of boundary quality as rather 
the capacity for contact. The capacity for intimacy, in terms 
of the above definition, and the quoted r%Rarch in the area
-
would be a combination of the size (Identity)'; content (ego 
development); and boundary quality (capacity for contact) of the 
transitional space.
4.8 Marriage:
!&e question that follcws £ran the above discussion is, can 
there be marriage without intimacy? The answer is i'ti the 
affirmative, as many people marry while- experiencing.. the 
ccnbination of passion and good contact. However, tb.-y partners 
may not have either the level of development that would allow 
for commitment, or perhaps the motivation for the commitment 
that will carry the marriage through the rough periods that 
inevitably occur in every marriage.
Marriages that last must have a level of commitment, and if 
they still maintain gccd contact, in the sense of the 
alternation of the blurring of boundaries and withdrawal, it may 
be said that it is a relationship of intimacy. Mtist marriages 
begin with at least passion ana contact. It is the existence 
of just those two aspects without commitment that is termed 
infatuation; and it is commitment that transmutes it to love. 
Marriages that begin with all three are obviously best able to 
weather the vagaries of marital life. Nevertheless, as Erikson 
suggests, if commitment only develops later, that too will make 
far a successful relationship.
In describing the different types of marriages, we are 
looking at the capacity for extended relationships. It is 
useful to examine this aspect in the light of the kinds of
individuals derived in the .description of the Transitional 
Space, and hew these types may come together in terns of a 
relationship. Although there are many different variations and 
ccmputations of the three aspects of personality functioning as 
described in the hypothetical construct of the Transitional 
Space, relationships will be described that result only from the 
aforementioned types. Also, on the. basis of dealing with a 
normal population, only those which exclude obvious pathology 
will be described. Thus personality types 4 and 6 which do not 
fit the "normal" paradigm will be excluded.
The illustrations of marital types may be found in Appendix 
C. In this chapter, aspects of love, contact and intimacy have 
been described and related to the concept of the Transitional 
Space. Finally, a description of different marital types was 
presented on tha basis of all the aforementioned material. In 
the following chapter, the concept and process of change is 
examined, as the interest in this work lias to do with how 
different individuals and marital configurations accomodate to 
change.
CTRFTER 5
QffiNGE
Life is a continuous series of changes. The recent burgeoning 
field of adult development attests to the understanding that 
adult human beings do not come to the end of their maturation 
and develcpnent at the advent of adulthood, but continue to 
grow, develop and nature all the -way through their adult years. 
Eriicscn, the first raj or theoretician to acknowledge the notion 
of life span development, in developing his epigenetic
principle, saw change as a natural progression through life. 
The resolution of the crisis of identity vs identity diffusion 
is tested by the necessity to transcend it, by risking -thg.t'--1. 
identity in the fusion with another, to resolve the '
intimacy vs isolation; whereas intimacy naturally, 1 
evolve into the concern for the next generation, and thus ihcw 
the stage of development of generativity vs stagnation.
Modem theorists, basing their work cm Erikson, have viewed 
the life cycle in teims of stages of quiet and periods of 
upheaval. Allman and Jaffe (1932) describe how "the life 
process consists of a somewhat orderly sequence of developmental 
stages and tasks, Whidi are punctuated at each point by 
individual crises and difficulties" (1982 p.3 ).
Levinson (1979) describes how the life cycle evolves through 
a relatively ordered sequence during the adult years; and that 
the essential nature of the sequence consists of an alternating
succession of stable ana transitional periods. Both Erikscn 
(1968) and Levinson (1979) explain the process and the tasks of 
the transitional periods. Erikscn writes of how the individual 
Iteeds to rework all the previous stages as well as risk the last 
achieved stage in order to progress. Levinson asserts that the 
primary developmental task of each transitional period
; "is to terminate the existing structure and to work toward the initiation of a new structure. This requires a man 'to reappraise the existing, life structure, to explore various possibilities for change in the world and in the- self, and to move toward the crucial choices that would form the basis for a new life structure in the ensuing stable period" (p. 100).
What may be clearly deduced from the above is that these 
descriptions imply a large psychological upheaval during such 
periods, and Erikson has termed the periods "crises". The 
problem of the term, "crisis" and its implications have been 
discussed in a previous chapter.
It is the term crisis that appears to produce a lot of 
confusion, both in the understanding of Erikson's work and in 
the use of the term in other areas of psychological 
investigation, particularly the one under present study. In 
the Eriksonian sense, crisis is viewed as a turning point, a 
period of "increased vulnerability and heightened potential".
It is in this sense, the Eriksonian sense of a developmental 
turning-point or point of change,that the birth of a first 
child, where developmental familial and societal pressures 
change, might be thought of as a crisis.
Critical stages demand that the individual face and 
resolve particular issues, and Erlkson describes these 
resolutions in terms oL! their polar opposites, such as trust vs 
mistrust; identity vs diffusion or confusion, as well as the 
virtues that result out of the positive resolution of the,® 
crises, sutih as hope; will} purpose; fidelity; care and 
others. • The process of the resolution of these crises is also
important to understand in aha conception of EtiJcson's model.
In the struggle to deal with the particular crisis at hand, 
ErBcson does not postulate the achievement of a total victory of 
one positive polar opposite over the other, but simply a dynamic 
balance in one's favour. He writes,
Cevelopmentally it suggests a dialectic dynamics, in that the final etrenth postulated, could not emerge withouteither of the contending qualities; yet to assure growth, the syntonic, the one more, intent on adaptation, muistabsorb the dystonic. (1978 p.26).
Erlkson continues to describe how the struggle remains 
persistent and a stage is never once and for all "attained”, but 
needs to be confirmed and reconfirmed at many different points. 
In effect, then, as described and reaffirmed by Brikson, nobody 
in life is "neatly located in one stage." A view of someone in 
life will reflect an oscillation between at least two stages and 
a ircve to a higher one only when an even higher one comes into 
play. In fact the "achievement" of an overformulated sense of 
identity, for example, may hinder the sense of variability so 
important in the living of a well adjusted life.
Change may manifest as either small variations in the natural 
progression of daily living, or major changes as illustrated in 
major life events like marriage, the birth of a first child, 
divorce or the death of a spouse. It hau been emphasized by 
some researchers, (Holmes and Rahe, 1967? Holmes and Masuda, 
1974) that it is the magnitude of change in a person's life that 
is the key factor related to the amount of adjustment required. 
However, others propose that other factors such as the quality 
of the stressor, in terms of desirability or undesirability or 
the area of stress, are also relevant (Gersten et. al, 1974; 
Vinokur and Seltzer, 1975? Ruch, 1977). There are three 
aspects of change to which every individual must respond during 
the course of their lives. The aspects of change are internal 
or intrapsycdiic change? interpersonal change? and 
environmental change.
Internal change, although most often precipitated by an 
external event, are changes in the intrapsychio functioning of 
the individual. This may be represented by further progress in 
ego development, with its concomitant developing ability to deal 
with conflict and paradox, and concern for others? or it may be 
a function of the the engagement in, or resolution of one of the 
stages of development, resulting in a differing perception of 
self and others, and thus a different set from which to view the
Environmental change may be described as a change ?n the 
physical context within which the couple live. '..his ray vary 
from moving home, to the addition or loss of a family member.
Interpersonal change is concerned with the differences and 
changes in a person's relationships with others. In this 
particular study the relationship of prime concern is the 
marriage.
Irrespective of the environmental impingements on the 
couple, it is suggested by most writers that a love 
relationship, and most particularly a marriage# will go through 
a life course of its own. This may be roughly delineated as a 
romantic "honeymoon" phase, followed by a period of 
disillusionment, and finally acceptance. A novel interesting 
and realistic perspective, that includes a clear description of 
the life course of a marriage, but extends the view to sea it 
also as a recurring cycle, is prop ■ M  by Weiner (1980). It is 
the repetitive nature of the love cycle, as described by Weiner, 
that makes it of interest in the present study. Weiner 
describes a series of five stages that are repetitive, 
comprising what he terms, the love cycle. Be suggests that..
An intimate relationship that lasts over a significant period of time will go through mazy partial or full love cycles as the people change individually, and as partners in the relationship.
(P. 22)
Briefly, a description of the five stages is as follows:
First stage is early courtship.
The second stage of romantic love is "falling". Falling 
pertains to the partially involuntary reduction of the lovers' 
ordinary interpersonal boundaries, which are lowered to allow 
the other "in" and which lead to the feeling of emotional and 
physical fusion. The transition from romantic to
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corpanionate love e--. ptoses tno last three stages of the love 
Stage three is unmasking.
In stage four, the disappointed lovers attempt to force their 
beloved to became what they were thought to be or were expscted 
to become.
Stage five is the stage of resolution. Illusion is recognized 
as illusion.
Th6 capacity to cane to satisfactory conflict resolution 
is the hallJiBrk of a truly adult love relationship, for it .is 
not based on idealization, but on increasing acceptance of the 
other as he or she really is.
In surnnary then, no part of adult life may be seen as 
constant or unchanging, whether it is on the intrapsychic, the 
marital, or the environmental level.
Despite the variant sources of change, there is, on the part of 
the individual, seme drive for homeostasis or sweness, for the 
safety of continuity and the knowledge of constancy. Sullivan, 
(1933) formulated a theory of ego stability, an anxiety-gatiry 
theory. In this formulation the person, by selective
inattention, recognizes only that which fits his self system. 
His ego is thus his frame of reference, and will be maintained 
as it stands, with the purpose of minimizing anxiety.
The concept of the gating mechanism proposed by Sullivan, 
has been accepted by loevinger (1970) as the mechanism used to 
maintain the stability, identity and cdierence of the ego.
A process of identity maintainance and change very similar 
to the arodety gating theory has been described by Whitboume 
and We instock (2,979). They prqposa that a derivation of the 
Piagetian concepts of accommodation and assimilation provide an 
authentic description of the process of identity change and 
maintainance. They propose that the process of 
assimilation is wha e^ the individual fits any new incoming
information into schemata that are already part of their
repertoire. In this circumstance their is a rigid and defensive
sense of self. This individual resists change to maintain that 
sense of identity. It is only when faced with a situation that 
is so divergent frctn what may be comfortable dealt with, that 
they fall into crisis and at that point have to accomodate and 
change aspects of identity.
In this "realistic appraisal of one's identity, one's
experiences and the congruence between the two" (Whitboume, 
1986 p.30), there is a serious challenge to the sense of
identity that the individual has been holding. It will result 
in the need to consider taking steps in order to regain 
equilibrium, and these steps would visually involve a change of 
identity.
As mentioned above, interpersonal relationships also do not 
remain constant. The myth of "and they got married and lived
happily ever after" has <i> “'appointed many generations of couples 
with its promise of eti.*.ial bliss. As described by rjavinson
(1979) and others, there aba. stable and transiclonal periods in 
individual and personal life. Curing periods of transition, 
the existing structures are terminating and a re-evaluation of 
life and its structures needs to take place., During such 
periods of psychological or emotional upheaval there is a 
tendency for an individual to regress and experience a need for 
emotional dependence. Janis (1958) terms this regression 
"apparently out gram inodes of response to childhood dangers" 
(p.224). He also addresses the need for emotional dependence. 
He . writes about a "marked increase ;Ln affillative needs" 
repeatedly noticed among persons who are exposed to external 
dangers or deprivations, (p. 225). "Romantic solutions" to 
problems .ui living have been, found to be a particularly 
conspicuous feature of transitional periods, irrespective of the 
era in which they occur (Becker, 1973). An understanding and 
combination of the work of Sargant (1959) and Janis (1958) would 
exemplify this process. Janis describes how in response to 
stress, individuals regress. Sargant describes how stress 
increases a person's suggestibility, and alteration of a 
person's thinking processes may be achieved; and Janis also 
tali'-a about the increase -in affiliative needs under stress. 
This process of stress and regression may explain ktiy the
solutions at this period are romantic, Romance fills the
infantile or Child need to lose boundaries, but in an adult 
sense. In fact the experience of deep intimacy has been 
described by seller and Rcwenstein (1980), Weiner (1980) and 
others, as temporary loss of boundaries, indicating a temporary 
regression to tiie earliest levels of psychossxual development, 
when one was not able to differentiate one's self from one's 
environment. Thus particularly for some adults, each
transitional point may result in a romantic solution - either 
the reaffirmation of a cormitment, or commitment to a new 
romance. It becomes interesting at this point to examine how 
the propositions of Goethalls (1980), Livingstone (1980), 
Csikszentmihalyi (1980) and Becker (1973) support this 
contention. All of the above describe how love exists and is 
kept alive with seme level of concomitant threat. Goethalls
(1980) defines love as an "amalgam of profound ecstasy with the 
anticipation of possible loss." A related view is that of 
Livingstone (1980), who proposes that as long as there is a 
continuation of the reduction of uncertainty, individuals will 
continue to experience love. As described above, Becker (1973) 
describes romantic solutions as a feature of transitional 
periods; and csikszentmihalyi (1980) refers to the dynamic 
balance between challenges and skills. Thus it would appear 
that both falling in love and staying in love are particularly 
relevant during changepoints in the life of an adult.
The cyclical nature of the love relationship accords well 
with what has been described above with respect to transitions
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in the relationship. Ihus, a transitional period, whether 
precipitated internally by personal change or externally by 
environmental change, will have similar effect. On the basis
of a gocd, cpen and well functioning system in which both 
parties have the ocsnmitment that was described as being so 
iirpcartant, it will stimulate the start of a cycle, manifesting 
early courting and falling in love again. This will be
experienced and perceived as a imitative relationship with new 
challenges and the learning of new skills. It will provide a 
whole new bank of uncertainty that will feed into the system, 
and thus the reduction of uncertainty will begin afresh - with 
new horizons pertaining to many emergent motivations.
In a relationship which on the other hand, is a pathological 
one, or has major ill-functioning elements, the transitions, 
experienced as stress, will lure the partners into their cwn 
scripts (Berne 1978). This will result in repetitive attenpts
to meet unconscious fixated needs in a closed system. The 
partners will experience stress and anxiety, and the fixations 
defining the closed system will restrict the couple from finding 
their own solutions.
Because of the increased vulnerability, both in terms of the 
original stress and in terms of the corpounded stress of not 
being able to get needs met in the relationship, there will be 
an increased chance of a ronantic solution outside of the 
relationship.
5.3 Charae and the Sixth of a First Child
Jaffe and Allman in their discussion of Change, conflict and
couple styles, describe how,
Just as the individual has a life cycle, so too do a couple and a family. A couple and family are unitscontinually adapting to. new situations and crises bymodifying their structure. For exanple, no change is so profound as the emergence of a third person out of acouple, and the birth of a child profoundly andpeiaenei.tly alters the nature of a couple.(p. 180)
A marriage has to respond to the changes that occur from the
developmental life sequence of the family itself. As the
development of the family proceeds, its members must accommodate 
to the transitions, and the form of the family itself must 
change. The form and develqanent of the family system has been 
described by Friedman and Shmukler (1985). In this 
formulation, the concepts of Parent Adult and Child originated
by Berne (1981) to describe states of the ego, have been
extended back into what was their original derivation, the
family system. The Parental subsystem in the family, refers to 
whoever occupies the limit setting and nurturing functions, the 
Adult subsystem reflects whoever is in the decision and problem 
solving roles; and the Child subsystem represents those members 
of the family who are in effect the children or in children type 
roles or positions. In young couples, before the advent of 
children, they both should occupy the Parental, Adult and Child 
subsystems. In terms of this family systems model, a major
Jaffa ana Allman in their discussion of Charge, conflict and 
couple styles, describe how,
Just as the miividual has a life cycle, so too do a couple and a family. A couple and family are unitscontinually adapting to new situations arxi crises byncdifying their structure. For example, no change is so profound! as the >snergence of a tlazd person out of acoiple, and the birth of a child profoundly andpermanently alters the nature of a couple.{p. 180)
A marriage has to respond to the changes that occur from the 
developmental life sequence of the family itself. As the 
development of the family proceeds, its members must accommodate 
to the transitions, and the form of the family itself must 
change. The form and development of the family system has; been
described by Friedman and Shnukl&r (1985). In this
formulation, the concepts of parent Adult and Child originated
by Berne (1981) to describe states of the ego, have been
extended back into what was their original derivation, the
family system. The Parental subsystem in the family, refers to 
whoever occupies the limit setting and nurturing functions, the 
Adult subsystem reflects whoever is in the decision and problem 
solving roles; and the Child subsystem represents those members 
of the family who are in effect the children or in children,type 
roles or positions. In young couples, before the advent of 
children, they both should occupy the Parental, Adult and Child 
subsystems. In terms of this family systems model, a major
changepoint in the family is the birth of a first child and thus 
the change from a dyad to a triad. At the point of the birth 
of the first child, the Child subsystem in the family increases 
in size, and both the Parental and Adult subsystems must be able 
to expand and grow in order to accomodate the increased needs of 
the biological - child as well as. the Child needs of both of the 
parents. However, if the system is a closed fixated system 
that doesn't take in new information, there will be major 
problems in growing and accommodating to the needs of the 
developing family. In terms of the construct of the
Transitional Space, the family system represents the overall
overlap of all the transitional spaces of the tneiabers of that 
system.
The advent of the birth of a first child has two aspects.
Not only is there the event of the birth and the addition of
this new child to the family so that the family system must
change, but there is also the required change in identity of 
both of the partners, from simply husband and wife, to also 
parent. In terms of BriJcson's description of a crisis being a 
normative turning point and a period of increased vulnerability 
and heightened potential, this period, around the time of the 
birth of the first child, is exactly that. It is most certainly 
a turning point or changepoint and a period of increased 
vulnerability as spoken of at length in the literature. As 
described above, this transitional period will precipitate
similar responses to other periods of upheaval, depending on 
intrapsychic, interpersonal airi situational factors. On the 
interpersonal - level, depending on the type of relationship the 
couple already have, this period of transition will tfisult in 
either a recanmitmenfc, a reawakening of passion, and a growth in 
the love relationship, or alternatively, a weakening of the 
bonds and the beginning of the dissolution of the relationship.
The birth of a first child, unlike many other upheavals in 
life, has a nine month anticipatory period. People or couples 
may approach the advent of their first child in different ways. 
There may be no preparation in anticipation of the changes, or 
alternatively, they may try and find the information relative to 
helping them cope with the forthcoming changes. Thus one 
couple may happen on this crisis "suddenly", that is, at the 
birth, as a fait: acccnplit, and without any prepax 'Lion. This 
couple will attempt to fit this rather different style of life 
into their prevailing schemata, often with quite traumatic 
results. Alternatively a couple, through bo'bh conscious and 
subconscious preparation, will go through a slow process of 
multiple accommodations over the course of the time preceding 
the birth, and thus would anticipate and begin to make, the 
required changes.
Pregnancy is often referred to to a time of "preparation" 
for parenthood. It is certainly preparation at this level as 
well as preparation at other levels that is assumed.
• U .  ' I  ■
Erikson,describes this very succinctly.
"A baby's presence exerts a consistent and persistent domination over the outer and inner lives of every member 
of a household. Because these mentoers must reorient themselves to accomodate his presence, they must also 
grew as individuals and as a group. It is as true to say that babies control and bring up their families as it is to say the converse. A family can bring up a baby only by being brought up by him. His growth consists of a series of challenges to them to serve his newly developing potentialities for socialinteractions. (1959, P. 57)
A model of successful and unsuccessful adaptations to change is 
presented on the following page:

Change as a stressor, produces increased vulnerability and 
heightened potential. This results in regression and a 
concomitant need for affiliation. fn a good, adaptable and 
committed marriage, which Is an open system, this will result in 
a further commitment to the marriage, a rcmantic solution, and 
the start of another love cycle. In a poor marriage, on the 
other hand, that functions as a closed system, this stress will 
also produce a regression and the need for affiliation, bit 
because that early need is not being met by the partner, the 
partners will both get locked in their Interlocking- rackets; 
the repetition compulsion. Thus it results in the weakening of 
the bends of the marriage and the stronger possibility of those 
affiliation needs being rot outside of the relationship.
The different types of relationships, as described in 
Appendix A will each respond differently to the advent of change 
in general and to the birth of a first child in particular. 
The differences will be described in terms of the three aspects 
o£' the transitional spaces within which the relationships exist.
Boundary; Hie capacity for contact. This is of relevance with 
the addition of a child. With flexible/permeable boundaries 
there will be the joy of intimacy. At the other extreme, with 
impermeable/rigid boundaries, there will be extreme difficulty 
in relating to a baby.
- .cm.
Size: In terms of ego development, people at higher levels of
ego develcpnent are more- able to tolerate conflict and 
paradoxical relationships and so will adapt more easily to the 
difficulties inherent in the birth of a first child.
Content: Different kinds of identities will obviously
acccmcda -3 differently to this change. However, looking at it 
simply from the perspective of the resolution of identity, the 
four statuses will represent different ways of dealing with 
change:
The different types of identity crisis resolution will also 
result in difference responses to the change in general, and to 
the birth of the first child in particular.
Identity Achieved; These people may have some problems giving 
up the identity that they have forged for themselves, to become 
a parent. Parenthood may however be part of the identity 
itself.
Foreclosed Identity: These individuals will have problems if
parenthood is not written into the foreclosed identity
structure.
Diffuse; There is actually no identity, so they will drift into 
parenthood without major problems.
This will most probably be problematic as 
this As a rigid structure, with parenthood probably not part of 
it.
Appendix C consists of a table describing the main types 
of marital relationships derived from the construct of the 
Transitional Space. Each description is followed by a brief and 
sifiple comment as to the projected capacity of that relationship 
to i, cope with the birth of the first child.
i : What is evident from the descriptions of different marital
coiifigurations is that adaptability and response to change, 
particularly the change from the birth of a first child, is 
dependent upon the personal histories ot the couple, their 
relationship and their environment, and will be different for 
different couples. As difficult as it is to address all these 
different aspects of the lives of the couples and their 
marriages, basic assumptions have been made and tested about the 
general dynamics of stress and coping techniques,
§
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Understanding the process of change and different responses to 
both chance and stressful situations are helpful in the
anticipation of such occurrences However, there is research 
which demonstrates that interventions prior to the changes or 
stress can be of value in easing the passage through the changes 
Research into the the value of adequate preparation for 
stress is quite extensive. Amongst the most well known work is 
that of Janis {1958), and Maicheribaum (1977).
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Janis writes that,
Ohe relationship between the level of anticipatory fear and subsequent emotional react tern to stress is a modifiable one, implying a causal sequence of intervening processes that can be directly influenced by socialcommunication or by other environmental events during the threat phase. (p.262)
He also asserts that a person's capacity to assimilate a 
stressful event without developing residual emotional 
disturbances depends upon the degree to which he has mentally 
rehearsed . the situation in advance, and worked out reassuring 
thoughts and measures that can function effectively to
counteract, the feelings of helplessness.
Strategies that make for successful adaptation are also 
described by White (1977). He suggests that the individual
(a) keep securing adequate informal,ion about the 
envirormant,(b) maintain satisfactory internal conditions both for action and for processing information, and(c) maintain its autonomy or freedom to uile its repertoire in a flexible fashion,
(p. 34)
Independently, although supportive of tlie position taken 
by Janis, White also contends that securing actejuate information 
about the environment is an obvious necessity for adaptive 
behaviour.
In considering the transition to parenthood, with the 
increase in the popularity of antenatal education, couples are 
prepared for the actual childbirth and there is often sane
preparation for aspects of child care. However there is little, 
if any preparation and information that is passed on to the 
couple, aa to the changes that will take place in their 
.individual lives, their relationship as a couple, their 
identities, and all other aspects of their lives that must 
necessarily mange with the advent of a "family".
What is clear from the work on interventions, is that 
interventions can be extremely valuable in helping individuals 
cope during periods of change or stress. Also, that any 
intervention that is aimed at increasing ability to cope with 
the stresses involved in the birth of the first child, must 
include information; mist be aimed at creating or maintaining 
satisfactory internal conditions ? and must aim at maintaining 
autonomy. Thus, an intervention needs to address the
affective, behavioural, and cognitive aspects of the individuals 
(Brskiire, 1975). Despite this, when examining the different 
types of relationships and their adaptability to change, it 
appears that those who will adjust well to change anyway, are 
those who will benefit most fzm the intervention, while those 
who have difficulties in their j/alaticnships m y  also have 
difficulties integrating and using the material from the 
intervention.
On the basis of the "obvious necessity for information" 
for adaptation (White, 1977), couples embarking on the road to 
parenthood without information will be less equipped to deal

'Ihe study of the birth of the first child and its effects on the 
parents is of fairly recent interest. ' Until such time as the 
inyth of parenthood began to be seriously., questioned in the work 
of Le Masters {1957}, an idealized image of pregnancy, 
childbirth and parenthood reigned. This myth was reinforced by 
the conspiracy of silence around aspects of this period, 
particularly the labour and delivery itself. Young', romantic, 
unsuspecting women and men were cast into., the mire of potential 
difficulties of the perinatal period. ' In terms of this myth, a 
loving couple, who desire tp=---exEer>d and share their loving 
relationship, decide to hSve a,, baby. The myth continues, in 
tliat this wanted pregnancy is undertaken joyfully, and that the 
excitement and pleasure generated by this lyrical and enchanting 
pregnancy will culminate in an equally uncomplicated delivery. 
After a short period, where the major problem is one of 
disturbed nights, the family will 'settle dcwn to enjoy the 
growth and development of a sweet smelling, gurgling and 
delightful baby, th*\ earing for, and enjoyment of which will 
enrich their relationship.
Unfortunately, the face of reality made a forced intrusion 
into this fairy tale world. On the one hand, the disturbingly
■f ■
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hicgi divorce rate, that continues to increase, compels the 
search for the point at which the seeds of discontent are sewn 
in what start out as "happy" marriages. On the other hand 
researchers searching for areas to study, begin to remove the 
veil off secrecy frtm aspects of marital life.
In summary, the early series of studies on the 
transition to parenthood attempted to ascertain whether the 
transition to parenthood is a crisis (leMaters, 1957? Dyer, 
1963f Hctobs, 1965). In the years following, the interest 
changed fran establishing 'whether it was a crisis or not, to 
describing the dnasqes and the effects of those changes on the 
couple and on their relationship (teifer, 1977; Falicov, 1971? 
Grossman et al, 1980). The description of the process of change 
has also stimulated the interest of sociologists, (LaRossa, 
1977? La Fossa and laRossa, 1981), who criticize the 
"individualistic1 approach arri emphasize the holistic aiyj 
sociologically based research.
Finally, a number of researchers have reported on , 
interventions conducted during the perinatal period to prepare 
couples for the changes and help them negotiate the changes 
involved in the transition to parenthood. (Cowan and Cowan et 
al, 1978? Clulow, 1982; Houde, 1987),
At the outset, in embarking on a review of the literature , 
with respect to the transition to parenthood, it should be noted 
that the research into this area has taken place in different 
countries of the world, ana thus in different sociocultural 
settings. An equally important constraint is the fact that
these studies have taken place over the past thirty years, 
during which time there have been significant changes, both in 
the relationship between the sexes, and in the institution of 
marriage, as well as in the wider context of societies, 
technology and in the rate of change itself. Finally, many of 
the studies on the transition to parenthood, because of the 
interest in in-depth, intrapsychic, rather than statistical 
information, have been carried out with small and unrepresented 
samples. '[hus it is with the understanding of these variations 
that care ahd reticence should be exercised in the drawing of 
any firm conclusions.
The early work of LeMasters (1957) described the transition to 
Parenthood sis a crisis. Shis article stimulated a great deal of 
interest and was follcwty! by, amongst others, the work of Dyer 
(1963), Hofcbs (1965, 1968), Bussell (1974), Hobbs and Cole
(1976), Leifer (1977) and Hobbs and Wimbisli (1977). - The common 
and principle question in all the aforementioned studies was the 
question as to whether the transition to parenthood constitutes 
a crisis. The results of the studies were varied. LeMasters 
(1957), Dyer, (1963), leifer (1977), Falicov (1971) and Grossman 
et al, (1980) found strong evidence for viewing the transition 
to parenthood as a crisis.
As we have seen at every point in this study, for primlparous women end their husbands, pregnancy and early parenthood are indeed a crisis of considerable proportions
wherein many of their resources - psychological, sociocultural; physiological and marital - are called, into play. Those couples with significant problems in any of these areas seem handicapped in their capacity to navigate successfully the enormously complex tasks involved in having a first child. (Grossman et al, 3.980). 
The period of transition to parenthood has also been termed one 
of stress, certainly in terms of the new mother (Leifer, 1977; 
Benedek, 1959)? but also with respect to the father (Bowels, 
1972; Coleman, 1969) and the relationship between the husband 
and wife (Cohen, 1966; Melges, 1968; Yalom et al., 1968).
In terms of systems theory , the birth of a first child is 
also considered a crisis, both for the family as a system and 
for the individuals who make up that system (Minuchin, 1974; 
Friedman and Shmukler, 1985).
There is, therefore, a fairly large body of both theory 
and research that views the birth of the first child to be a 
crisis or stressful event in the development of the family and 
its members.
The "crisis" perspective has been seriously questioned by 
the findings of Hobbs (1968) and Hobbs and Cole (1976) and the 
reports of numerous parents who did not find this a difficult 
period in their l%ves (Belsky, 1985),
The other major approach to the transition to parenthood 
is the developmental approach. The developmental approach is 
represented in the perspectives of Deutsoh (1945), Benedek 
(1959), Bibring (1959) and Caplan (I960). Prom this
perspective, pregnancy and the perinatal period in general, is 
viewed as a period of developmental crisis characterized by a 
psychological disequilibrium which is experienced as stress.
Ihe disequilibrium provides the jnaturational potential for new 
and more adaptive solutions t o  earlier conflicts. [These views 
echo and strongly support the Eriksonian perspective that 
provides the theoretical basis for the current work].
Rossi (1968) strongly reccsnmended dropping the use of the term 
crisis, even though it referred to a normative-crisis. She 
suggested, that the term transition to and impact of parenthood, 
rather tiian "crisis" .be used, as the implication of normative 
crisis is successful outcome, and this is not necessarily the 
case with the transition to parenthood.
"If the transition is achieved and if a successful reintegration of personality or social roles occurs, then crisis is a misnomer. (Rossi, 1967. p. 230) 
in the resolution to the problem of conceptualizing this 
transition, Rossi (1967) emphasizes the importance of a 
conceptual system that addresses both positive and negative 
outcomes. She suggests that the stage-task concepts of 
Brikson, viewing parenthood as a developmental stage would be 
the most successful perspective. Briksc himself, (1973) 
terns the movement into, and dealing with the problems of each 
developmental stage, a crisis. As discussed previously 
(Chapter 3 ) the use of the term "crisis" from the Eriksonian 
perspective, asserts that it is accepted "in a developmental
sense to connote not a threat of catastrophe, but a turning 
pciivt, a crucial period of increased vulnerability and 
heightened potential" (p. 96r 1568). Thus despite the birth of 
a first child constituting . the transition to parenthood from 
Rossi's perspective, the understanding of crisis in Er?ksonian 
terms still qualifies for it to be termed a developmental 
crisis, if not a crisis in the sense of catastrophe.
Rossi's extremely influential article, although published 
in 1968, still appears in the majority of texts on adult 
development. This article apparently did have the impact 
intended by Rossi; that of moving the transition to parenthood 
out of the crisis literature, and into the developmental arena. 
It was on the basis of the argument that the conceptualization 
of ttie transition to parenthood needs to address the possibility 
of both positive and negative outcomes,that the term
"developmental changepoint" (Erskira 1980) was adopted in the 
present dissertation. It allows for the option of change in 
either a forward or regressive direction (leifer 197?). It also 
reflects this paint, of transition to parenthood, as part of an 
ongoing process of development and adaptation (White 1977) 
within the individuals and their relationship, rather than a 
clear-cut transition from one state to another.
Whether one views the transition to parenthood as a 
crisis, a developmental crisis or simply a transition, what is 
clear to all is that the perinatal pericd, and the transition to 
parenthood in particular, is a time of enormous change in a
marriage, arti for individuals in that marriage. This 
experience is well expressed in an excerpt from a novel by Mora 
Ephron,
After Sam was fc'im, I remember thinking that no one had ever told me how much I would love my child? now of course, I realized something else no one tells you: that a child is a grenade. When you have a baby, you set off an explosion in your marriage, and when the dust settles, your marriage is different from what it was. Not better necessarily, not worse, necessarily, but different.(p. 158)
In his book, Conflict and Power in Marriage, laRossa (1977) 
taking the change one step further, concludes,
Perhaps the most significant contribution which this book makes is that it exposes a myth. Marriage and the transition to parenthood are not - indeed cannot be - conflict free. The notion that these experiences are - or could be - void of conflict may, more than anything else, be at the root of dissatisfaction and breakdown in marriage and family systems. We may, in effect, be victims of our own ideals."(p. 151)
In his search for concepts and hypotheses to explain the 
transition to parenthood, LaRossa, proposes a model. He calls 
this model a Conflict Sociological Model of the Transition to 
Parenthood which is based in a conflict orientation (Sprey,
1979). The diagram of the model is illustrated below:

LaRossa (1981) follows the diagramming conventions proposed 
by Burr et al., (1979b) and Iteiss and MlUer (1974), where the 
cause 1 propositions are- represented by the chain of variables 
linked together by plus signs, while the contingency 
prepositions are represented by the bisecting lines with circled 
notations. Plus signs denote positive causal relationships and 
negative signs denote negative causal relationships, 
Contingency propositions denotes that there exists a variable
that specifies corditions Under Wlcti causal relationships are
altered. The use of e. small arrow, facing either up or down, 
followed by the letter S, denotes the qualifying effect of the 
contingency variable; up arrow/s means that as the contingency 
variable" increases, the causal relationship that it bisects
becomes stronger; down arrow/s means that as the contingency 
variable decreases, the causal relationship that it bisects
becomes stronger.
For the sake of clarity, the two kinds of contingency 
variables are also denoted by whether they are above or below 
the chain.
The value and the perceived shortccmings of this model will 
be discussed in a further chapter.
tlirgt ..Qiild
A number of studies have found that the period of pregnancy is 
for the pregnant woman, one of emotional disequilibrium 
(Bibring, 1959? Coleman, 1969; Grimm, 1969 Newton, 1963), while 
others have questioned that finding (Hooke and Marks, 1963; 
jessner et al, 1970). Other studies, examining the early
postpartum period, have reported mood swings, feelings of 
anxiety and depression, distractitoility, prolonged crying
episodes, fatigue and hypersensitivity to possible rejection 
(Dalton, 1971; Gordon et al,19(35,• Kane and Harmon, 1968; Melges, 
1968; Williams, 1985; leifer, 1977). Fatigue, was found by 
Leifer (1977) to be the most commonly reported symptom 
postpartum. She continues to note that for most, women, 
irrespective of the degree of symptomatology, their physical 
discomforts were great contributors to the emotional stress of 
the period. She also found that in the postpartum period. more 
women felt negatively about their appearance than at any other 
time during the pregnancy.
A comprehensive study investigating the intrapsychic changes 
that occur during the first pregnancy and the early montiis of 
motherhood, was conducted by leifer (1977). Using a sample of 
19 primigravidas who came to the private patient cl ini. pf the 
Chicago lying-in Hospital for prenatal care, Leifer reported on , 
five major areas of change in affective life commonly 
experienced during pregnancy. These are: an increase in
anxietyt increased self-preoccupation and a corresponding
decline of ©notional investment in the exteriiEl world? 
intensified need for succourance? increased emotional 
lability? a’ 1 finally despite the increase in psychological 
stress, an intensified sense of well-being.
It is the paradoxical coexistence of so many opposing and 
contradictory fee' ■ '■% that is a significant aspect of the 
transition to partaictiood. in the same study, the postpartum 
period was found by Laifer (1977) to be characterized by the 
paradox of euphoria and elution, strongly predominant in the 
very early life of the baby, and depression and anxiety, that 
began to set in later. Satisfaction and accomplishment 
alternated with feelings of depression, isolation, 
dissatisfaction and borer1'-jn with the childcaring activities. 
Leifer found in her group that for most of the women, the early 
phases of parenthood wera experienced as a period of crisis, 
frequently exceeding that of pregnancy. The changes that the 
majority of the women experienced as stressful were: lack of 
help in caring for the baby and hone; cuttailii&nt of personal 
freedom; changes in marital relationships ? and adaptations to 
the demands of the baby. Again, despite all these 
difficulties, most women experienced a sense of growth and 
expansion of the self, as well as of a greater completeness or 
wholeness as a person.
Falicov (1970}working jointly on the same sample as 
leifer (1977), developed and extended the interest to describe 
interactional aspects of the women with husbands, parents, peers
and obstetrical staff. Falicov found that, during the 
pregnancy, there were intense, .needs to rely pn their mothers, 
even though these, intense needs were/dften accompanied by 
rejection of the mother's teaching or advice.
Many . of the studies, describing the/ effects of the 
transiticij' ..j% ;fparenthood, have found the advent of the first 
child jjidrAbe tha of a,l^ ng-lasting decrease in marital
sativfa^ blcin (Feldrfifi, 1957,- falicov, 1971;,Grossman.,
«v. b>. 1980? RBllins.ard Gtilligan,. 1978). Mthour/i sonre studies 
" 1 n-j viharye, (Ryder, ^ l97|) , Riti Bome even shew an increase in
v'i^ital ratitii^ at^ xon, and Cnle, ' 1976; Meyerowitz and
1.resell, 1^), kb# majority of longitudinal 
h - ^  .fbund M#iy relipfcle, but -^snall,,. decreases in 
w^ tal-i.Sti^ isfaction (Bel^ ky , 1983; Cowan &nd Cowan,
'•f3^33;^dn^h:^ d Rogoff,, 19%- Miller ^ -d Sollie, 1980).
. ■ Raasons that have irjeen. "to explain the decrease in
marital satisfaction, ■' %£(&' of adequate preparation
(Rossi, 1967; Sol].,i.e!: lUSg; ' .Clulcxv ; romanticization of
parenthood ’ 1957); becaus^ i. M  their propensity for
other changed:, at this t^ime„ s^ ich ai>. ■ a new home or job, the 
difficulty of raking other major adjustments (Grossman et al 
(19H9;; ; ialicov, 1971); new parental/;: , tto^jes in conflict with 
ttieir other roles, such as oc(apations]i- (zmiiflitment; the lack of 
; esifijaate . guidelines for adjusting to this period resulting in 
; ■ pyncentraticn on the baby at the expense,; of devoting more time
t*. ' iLAe
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to egch other (Falicov, 1971).
Failure to accurately anticipate the nature of the baby's 
influence, bat more particularly the tendency to overestimate 
the positive effects of this event, were associated with 
negative change in the marital relationship as evaluated by 
wanen. (BeZsky et al., 1985).' '
Falicov also notes that the experiery if parenthood as a 
crisis, may be the paradoxical result of tiit .tdct thac most of 
these couples had had close intimate and. empathac relationships. 
She relates this finding to the invariability of the frustration 
of opportunities for psychological intimacy, catpanionship a»d 
sexual fulfillment, during early parenthood, which result in an, 
experience of the iMpdveirishment of the marital relationship, s 
With respect to the weman's assessment of their marriages, 
Grossmn et al (1980), made similar observations, ,yet from a 
different perspective, namely; that despite the marriages being 
cm of the strongest predictors of later psychological and. 
maternal adaptation, for most of the first time mothers and 
fathers, the birth of the child displaced the marriage as a 
focal source of gratification. They found that even though the 
marriage retained its position of being the central source of 
support for the women, it lost its place as the central issue 
during the early months of motherhood. Although by one year 
the marriage had regained seme of its importance, it never was 
quite the same.
It appears, - - frcm the majority qf the studies, that, the 
decline in marital satisfaction is mcjte severe for the women 
than for their husbands (Grossman, 198(i; Selsky et al., 1983? 
Belsky et al., 1985? . Waldran slii Routh, 1981? Miller arti
Sollie, 1980). . 'In feet Belsky et al., (1985) found that e'/en
though husbands and wives started off-rating their marriages 
differently, with the wives rating their marriages mu* higher 
than men initally, over the year ili which they-were-foHcwed the 
wives experienced much greater change, and by the end of the 
year, men and woman made similar appraisals of their marriage.
The observation that women are more involved in the 
marital relationship than their husbands, has led to a large 
body of research, confirming this observation. In addition it 
has been found that this involvement constitutes a source of 
psychological stress for women during different periods of the
life cycle, (Bernard, 1973,' Hawkins et al., 1980; Assor and
Asscr, 1985}. Assor and Assor, (1985) found that wives were 
mr.ie inclined to seek affection frac their spouses and it was 
more important to them to receive support, than to nurture their 
husbands. Lack of support and attsrrtjion from their husbands has 
been found to be distressing to new mothers (Ityder, 1973; Miller 
and Sollie . (1980). Husbands' mode of being-in-the-marriage is, 
in general, suggested by laws (1971), to toe fixed and 
unresponsive to changes and stresses in the family life. The 
duplication of the above findings with respect to a new mother's 
dependency, j -plies that the less dependent she is on. her
husband for oerttirg her needs .met, and the more independent she
is, the better the prognusis for her adaptation to early 
parenthood. This perspective is, in a sense, confirmed by 
Breen (1975), who found that one criterion for successful 
adaptation to motherhood was the capacity of parents to tolerate 
differentiation in their partnership after birth.
Feldman (1974) differentiated between companionate 
marriages, where the major satisfaction comes from activities 
within the marriages, and differentiated marriages, where the 
major satisfaction canes fran separate activities. As 
marriages become more traditionalized after the birth of the 
first child (laRossa 1977) there will be -a crisis of 
differentiation for the companionate marriages.
In another longitudinal study on the transition to 
parenthood, Miller and Sollie (1980) found that new mothers 
reported higher stress in their marriages after the baby had 
been bom than before, and even higher marital stress by the 
time the baby was eight months old. In contrast, hew fathers' 
marital stress scores -remained essentially the same across the 
year of the study.
A relevant binding by Belsky et al., (1985) was that the 
extent tc which spouses characterized their marriage as a 
friendship and as a romance decreased over time, while the 
extent to which they viewed their relationship as a partnership 
increased. For both romance and partnership this change was 
most pronounced for the period from the prenatal to three months 
postnatal. Hcwever, the one aspect that did not follow the 
general trends, was that for wives, romance actually increased
y ■;
fras throe to nine months postnatally.
It would appear, theriiface, that in those marriages where 
there js a great deeds' of closeness between husband and wife, 
strong dependency on the husband to meet their needs, and there 
is an unrealistic..-9>ipectation that the relationship will 
continue unchanged, there is a greater chance of a decrease in 
nferital satisfaction than if the spouses get iftbre of their needs 
met outside of the relationship. -This will be particularly true 
for fcne women, as it is they who have the major life change at 
the time of the birth of. 'their first child. The distress will 
be further exacerbated for women who have a career which they 
suspend or terminate at childbirth, as these woman were getting 
many needs met outside of the relationship, and are now forced 
to focus all dependency needs in the relationship, which is not 
accustomed to supporting such a large load to which is added the \ 
very demanding needs f>f a young infant.
There has been an increasing recognition of the value of 
seeing the marriage/ as a system (Falicoy, 1970 [1]; Grossman et 
al 1980) and thus understanding the interconnectedness of the 
husband and wife on levels of affect, thinking and particularly 
behaviour (Friedman and Shmukler, 1986? Fallow, 1970). In 
fact, Grossman et al (1980) argue that the woman's reactions to 
childbirth are a reflection and magnification of the couple's 
history of interaction and behaviour; and Belslcy et al., (1983), 
and Belsky et al., (1985) document that individual differences 
are strikingly stable across the transition to parenthood.
respite the difficulties of dealing with this transition 
there are numerous benefits. One of the major features of a 
developmental crisis, from Brikson's perspective (1973), is that 
it has the potential for growth as. well as regression. After 
tabulating 109 couples' positive and negative qualitative 
responses to open ended questions, Sollie and Miller (1980) 
described the nest apparent responses. Positive ti ones 
expressed by the couples were: "l /emotional benefits, self 
enrichment and development, family adhesiveness, and 
identification with -the child.
The four most common negative experiences were physical 
demands, strains on the husband-wife relationship, emotional 
costs, and opportunity costs and rt-,frictions.
It is not sinply the husband and wife in the relationship that 
are jjyortaht to the outcome, it is the quality of the 
relationship itself. There is evidence in the literature that 
it is the interpersonal relationship between husband and wife 
itself that may well be the irost important context within which 
the baby is bom and the relationships develop. (Dyer, 1963; 
Wenner and Cohen, 1968? Grossman et al 1980)
... aspects of the marital dimension proved to be among the strongest predictors of the woman's psychological adaptation throughout the study. Women who felt more positively about marriages felt less anxious and depressed in late ancy, at two months, and at one year postpartum. They ■•-a 1 fewer symptoms during the pregnancy and were substantially better adapted to the time of childbirth than
vjl
wcsnen less pleased with their marriages. In fact the quality of the marriage emerged as one of the two strongest predictors of the woman's psychological adaptation,(Grossman et al, 1960 p. 246)
As discussed previously, perhaps at the time of the transition
to parenthood, satisfaction with marriage may have more to do
with satisfying dependency needs than any other aspect of
marital satisfaction. Thir' view is confirmed by the findings
of Tietjen and Bradley (1985) and Leung" (1985), They found
that support from husbands was associated with good adjustment
in all areas during pregnancy and with good postpartum marital
adjustment.
A similar proposition by > > ~]L), but with the1
inclusion of the hu^ aands, was tllav .a is an equilibrium of 
dependency needs, in which giving and receiving are intensified 
and constantly intetplayed betyeen husband and wife. She 
further suggests
i ' o - i
that mrital carpatiaility . of "fit" and reciprocity or rxmplementarity of needs, regardless of dspth of interaction is an important determinant or the degree and manner to which couples are able to reorganize their usual,.modes of giving1 and receiving and to extend their giving to a child whileenhancing the unity of the marital pair, satisfaction ofthe wife/s and the husband's dependency needs sestis to fceconducive to unitary family integration and.mtttursince toward the newborn. (p. 237)
Anxiety is another aspect that has been clearly linked to the 
successful management of pregnancy, labour and the postnatal 
period (Friedman, 2''79; Grossman et al 1980). Throughout the
r1
perinatal pericd, up till at least one year post partum, for the 
men as well as for the women, the individual's level of anxiety 
was one of the strongest predictors of his or her health, 
behaviour and adjustment (Grossman eb al 1980).
Grossman efc al (1980) report that two of the strongest 
pcedictors of the woman's adaptation to labour and delivery 
were their husbard's previous anxiety level and satisfaction 
with their marriages. The anxiety measures centime to be 
predictive of adaptation postpartum,
Grossman et al*,(1980) conclude,
It is clear that woven rely enormously on continuing1 support and reassurance from their husbands for their sustained capacity to deliver and nurture a newborn and respond to its feeds without experiencing overwhelming anxiety. By one year postpartum, the lines of intarconitectedness in our data between mother and father were inextricably intertwined; nonetheless w  can isolate the men's anxiety level,, their degree of identification with a nurturantly perceived mother, and their adaptation to their wives and new dnfanti .in the early postpartum period - al', strongly interacted with the woman's psychological health at one year and the quality of their relationships with their babies.(p. 248)
The factor of the taportance of d 
and the wife are emphasized many t
1980). Falicov (1971) notes that
s of the husband 
s in this study (Grossman,
time alone with the husband was very high and was seen as the 
most painful aspect of parenthood. She notes alternating 
periods of regression and the needs for succouranca on the parts 
of both husband and wife.
The potential dangers of the inability to relinquish the infantile position for either husband or wife and to make roos for the baby seem to be gaining recognition by some, 
practitioners in the field of obstetrics.(Falicov, 1971. p. 238)
In summary then, it is clear that sane of die changes resulting
from the birth of the first child are perceived as stressful,
particularly those to do with diminishing contact and intimacy
between husband and wife and the regression and dependency needs
that ensue. 1 ^
The above literature describing the course of unmet
dependency needs in the husband and wife provide support for the
model proposed in chapter 5.
6.4 Calls fojr Interventions
The most striking feature amongst the women who experienced most 
difficulties in the transition to motherhood, was found by Breen 
(1975) to be the split between a very idealized picture of what 
they felt a mother should be like (often opposed to the bad 
mothering they felt they had received), and the way in which
they saw themselves after the birth of the baby. The same
process o£ idealization was at times present' in well adjusted 
Jmen during the pregnancy, however they generally modified 
their picture of the good mother after the birth of the baby, to 
a more realistic one with which they were no longer at odds.'
There have been many calls in the literature for soma
level ot preparation for parenthood? preparation to help
will have, on them as individuals, and on their marriage (Rossi, 
3.968; Mace and Mace, 1980). Many of such calls have been based 
on the clinical and empirical studies supporting the 
incorporation, of negative as well as positive elements into what 
makes for a good preparation for experience. This perspective 
was originally based on the work of Janls (1958), who found that 
patients with a particularly high or particularly low degree of 
anticipatory anxiety, recovered less well postoperatively than 
those who were modefately anxious. --'Those who experienced, 
moderate anxiety, could do, what he termed "the work of worry," 
and thus provide themselves with an "inoculation" for the 
difficulties ahead. In support of this perspective, Breen
(1975) found that women who managed well in childbearing showed 
Here feelings of insecurity and anxiety duv Lhg pregnancy than 
those who experienced difficulties, .and Friedman (1979) found 
that those women who coped well during labour were those who, 
amongst otheR things, had had a moderate degree of anxiety, and 
had acquired and assimilated a reasonable degree of knowledge 
about childbirth,
Amongst those who have called strongly for interventions 
both during pregnancy and after the birth of the baby, are 
Sollie and Miller (1900). They estimate that the value of 
preparation would be for adequate ana accurate information about 
the physiological processes and meet especially about aspects 
like changes in the sexual mlationship, feelings that new 
parents may have difficulty with, and for providirr parents with
grcup support thus setting up more realistic expectations. 
In support of the argument for inoculation, they suggest that if 
new parents are aware of sane of the things they are likely to 
experience, they will be better prepared to adjust.
The advantages they saw of continuing parenthood classes 
through the first year include:
1. Outlet for feelings.
2. Chance to watch other parents; Jowwledge and ideas 
about interaction.
3. Opportunity to participate; foster feelings of 
togetherness.
4. Shearing .ideas with others on adjusting to the 
changed marital relationship, and the changed role 
of the wife if she has stopped work.
Another call for preparation comes from Mace and Mace 
(1980). They note that all marriages which arn in trouble find 
themselves in such a position because no help was given to them 
when they were not in trouble; they suggest that something 
could have been done earlier tio keep them out ofi trouble. That 
something, they recommend to be preventative servige, "the best 
way to develop effective family strength" {p. 94).
Although the transition to parenthood 'has been targeted as 
providing a window of opportunity for preventative intervention 
(Wolkind, 1981), Markman and Kadushin (1986) note that there are 
no widely available interventions specifically designed to
prepare couples for becoming parents.
In terms of most preventative or therapeutic work, there 
has always been the problem that wives are more accessible and 
also more willing to attend courses or groups than husbands, 
This is compounded by the perspective that until fairly
recently, pregnancy, childbirth and parenting were "woman's 
work", and viewed as set clearly within the domain of the woman. 
As a result, most preventative and therapeutic work has been 
aimed at the wives. The practice, of therapy for the individual 
has been severely criticized by Napier {1980), as individual 
therapy is aimed at strengthening the independence and the 
autonomy of the individual. This process both separates the 
individual from his family and does not take into account the 
needs of the family from which that person has come. Clearly, 
when the aim is the development of a healthy marriage and 
family, the aim of any intervention must be to involve both the 
husband and wife.
Finally, in his statement about the value of intervention, 
dulow (1982 early) stated that it is net just infc-Tiation that 
is ; ■squired by new parents, but the encouragement or provision 
of the opportunity in which the highly personal task of 
reconciling oneself to a changed world can be attempted and 
sufficiently achieved.
Thus, the calls for intervention are concerned with the 
well-being of the couple and ultimately the family, in the birth 
pangs of the transition to parenthood.
There have been several reports of interventions conducted 
during the pregnancy and after birth. Systematic instruction 
o£ pregnant women to prevent emotional difficulties after birth, 
was designed by Gordon and Gordon (1960). The course consisted 
of formal lectures with advice on: reducing outside interests, 
resting, to be less concerned with appearances, and how and 
where to get outside support. He claimed" considerable success 
with this scheme. Interventions based less on formal 
information and more on dealing with intrapsychic and 
fetefpetsonal aspects have also claimed successes. One was run 
y Wilson (1968). He set up groups, where his role as group 
leader was to interpret the material produced by the mothers;
In another, run by Chertok (1969), it was found that the 
interpersonal support gained from the intervention was as 
important as the advice.
An intervention for couples that covered information as 
well as psychological aspects, and which continued to fun after 
the birth of the baby, was run by Cowan and Cowan et al 
(1978). A detailed description of the study by Cowan and Cowan 
will be presented, as this appears to be the single study that 
covers most of the necessary areas of the transition to 
parenthood. Ccwarv and Cowan began their groups in the third 
trimester of pregnancy, met weekly, and continued until the 
babies were about four months old. A "discussion" group was 
compared with first time parents who were not in a discussion 
group, and ccnpared with a second ccntrol group in which the
couples had no children and. the women were not pregnant
Cowan and Ccwan reported on the value of having the
opportunity to work with the couples during the transition, and : :
hew it allows partners to make their expectations explicit to
one another, to explore the actual experience of change, and to v M
come back to evaluate already discussed c specks of their lives
once the fantasized family has beccaoe real. They also-reported .
on the importance of the group experience, particularly as ;•
.pecple in the United States are so often far froin their extended . "  0 I
■ ;aifamilies. Cowan and Cowan suggest that by providing other
couples' experiences, of this transition, the groups may have ‘ - Vi:
helped to normalize aiv3 defuse the intensity of distress with |
oneself or one's spouse. They ' also found great value in 
working with the couples as couples, rather than with one 
member. J'
In the study by Cowan arti cowan, part of the V
psychologist's roles as facilitators was helping participants ~ |
appreciate both the enjoyable and threatening experiences they 
were having as a ceagple during pregnancy, and to consider what 
they would do if new family relationships and household 
responsibilities did not work cut the way they had expected.
The outcome of this study showed that almost v. ■. (92%) of 
the couples reported, that they were argomg more chan before 
the baby was bom. Overall satisfaction with the marriage
dropped suddenly among both groups of couples when their babies
were bom. However, the researchers found that for the
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